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Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values
THOMAS J. HORTON*
ABSTRACT
This Article traces Congress’s consistent balancing and blending of
social, political, moral, and economic values and objectives over the course
of nearly 120 years of antitrust legislation. As a starting point, a plethora of
outstanding and insightful scholarship analyzing Congress’s objectives in
passing the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts already exists. Less studied,
however, has been Congress’s more recent legislation, including the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act), and the
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004, to the
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRPA). By analyzing the
legislative histories of such antitrust legislation in detail, the author seeks to
show that Congress has never identified any single economic value such as
consumer welfare or allocative efficiency, as the sole guiding lodestar for
American antitrust. Rather, since 1890, Congress has successfully sought to
blend and balance a complex set of social, political, moral, and economic
ideals, values, and objectives in our antitrust laws.
The author believes that it is time to deal with the real social, political,
moral, and economic values conflicts in antitrust, instead of relying on
neoconservative economic proxies that unilaterally declare the values debates
to be scientifically and theoretically resolved. Based on nearly 120 years of
legislative history, the author concludes that we need to return to an antitrust
regulatory system that better reflects Congress’s dynamic historical balancing
and blending of multiple fundamental American social, political, moral, and
economic values. To do so, we must begin rediscovering antitrust’s lost
values, and recommence our historic pursuit of an ethical, moral, and fair
free-enterprise system truly devoted to the long-term economic and social
welfare of all Americans.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable to boldly proclaim that American antitrust is
edging closer and closer to a state of economic purity. Antitrust, it is argued,
is largely free today from the “pollution and dilution” caused by our historical
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consideration of political, social, and moral values in earlier antitrust
analyses.1 Such heady proclamations are based on the rapid ascendance over
the last 40 years of neoclassical economics, which largely rule American
antitrust today.2 In this theoretically pure economic world, American antitrust
1

See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust:
Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406–07 (2013) (arguing that the
“promotion of economic welfare as the lodestar of antitrust law—to the exclusion of
social, political, and protectionist goals—[has] transformed the state of . . . [antitrust]
law . . . .”); Theodore Voorhees, Jr., The Political Hand in American Antitrust—
Invisible, Inspirational, or Imaginary?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 557, 576 (2014) (arguing
that “the powerful impact of economic thinking” in conjunction with other legal
developments has yielded a body of economically-driven antitrust law that “is largely
impervious to political intrusion”); Id. at 562 (arguing that “it is certainly fair to say
that economics and its companion, empiricism, have largely displaced many of
antitrust’s more familiar populist themes from prior years”); Maurice E. Stucke,
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 556 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke
I] (discussing how, in recent years, some antitrust scholars and enforcers have “viewed
antitrust’s more salient, political, social, and moral goals as somehow diluting antitrust
policy”); Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and
the Future Development of Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 388
(2003) (arguing that limiting antitrust to economic goals and values frees antitrust
analyses from normative judgments); William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction:
The Draftsman’s View, 71 CAL. L. REV. 618, 619 (1983) (“[W]here there is conflict,
social and political goals should yield to economic considerations . . . .”); Darren Bush,
Too Big to Bail, 77(1) ANTITRUST L. J. 277, 279 (2010) (describing efficiency as the
“king” of antitrust); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at the International Conference on Competition: Competition and Politics,
at 6 (June 6, 2005) https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/competition-and-politics
[https://perma.cc/8739-DJYH] (arguing that incorporating “extraneous social and
political values” into antitrust will lead to outcomes that “will be polluted by values .
. . that just do not belong in sound competition analysis”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The allocative-efficiency or
consumer-welfare concept of competition dominates current thinking, judicial and
academic, in the antitrust field.”).
2
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
POSNER I] (“Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today—whether as
litigator, prosecutor, judge, academic or informed observer—not only agrees that the
only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees
on the essential tenets of economic theory . . . .”); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol,
The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 471, 473 (2012) (arguing that the goals of antitrust must be “understood by
economic analysis”); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy
Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2559 (2013) [hereinafter First & Waller]
(discussing how the American judiciary “has made antitrust overly technical and
overly dependent on economics”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Socio-Economic Approach
to Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, and Allocative Efficiency,
49 AKRON L. REV. 409, 409 (2016) (“American antitrust law may be particularly
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is now singularly dedicated to maximizing “consumer welfare” through an
intense focus on promoting “allocative efficiency.”3 “Discussions of modern
antitrust often emphasize its evolution, over the last several decades, into a
rigorous economic discipline that is largely technocratic and apolitical.”4
All is not well, however, in American antitrust’s neoclassical paradise.
Ominously, there are rumblings that we may begin rediscovering our historical
non-economic social, political, and moral antitrust values as we undertake
future antitrust analyses. One leading antitrust textbook warns:

representative of intellectual inertia. For over 40 years, it has teetered between strict
reliance on neoclassical economics and a deeply conservative political philosophy
characterized, at its most benign, by a distrust of government.”); Thomas J. Horton,
Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 823, 825 (2013) [hereinafter Horton I] (arguing that “[e]conomics rules antitrust
today”); Stucke I, supra note 1 at 563–66 (discussing the ascendance of Chicago
School’s neoclassical economic theories in American jurisprudence since the late
1970s).
3
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 91 (1978) [hereinafter BORK I] (arguing that antitrust must be unified
around the singular economic goal of “improve[ing] allocative efficiency “without
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no net gain or loss in
consumer welfare”); POSNER I, supra note 2, at vii–ix (“[T]he disputants are in
complete agreement . . . that considerations of allocative efficiency alone should guide
antitrust policy.” (internal quotations omitted) (second alteration in original)); Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman
[Antitrust] Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
704 F.2d at 376; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 266 n.11 (1981) (arguing that “the antitrust laws should be
treated as if they served no goal other than economic efficiency”); Albert Foer, On the
Inefficiencies of Efficiency as the Single-Minded Goal of Antitrust, 60(2) ANTITRUST
BULL. 103, 106 (2015) (arguing that the ascendance of “a single-minded drive for
‘efficiency’ masks losses of other types of economic values, resulting in a skewing of
economic analysis and policy outcomes”); Donald F. Turner, The Durability,
Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987)
(“The economic goal of [antitrust] policy is to promote consumer welfare through the
efficient use and allocation of resources . . . .”).
4
Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649,
649 (2014); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking
Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 305 (1987) (“Antitrust has become . . . a branch of
economics.”); First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2544 (describing the evolution of “an
antitrust system captured by lawyers and economists advancing their own
[technocratic] self-referential goals, free of political control and economic
accountability”; which places “too much control in the hands of technical experts”);
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
948 (1979) [hereinafter Posner II] (“Differences remain, but increasingly they are
technical rather than ideological.”).
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The U.S. and other nations sometimes have used antitrust to
promote non-economic goals . . . such as fairness, protection
of small firms, social justice, equity, and political stability.
These goals are ‘non-economic’ in the sense that they are
concerned with values other than the well-being of consumers
or the economy as a whole.5
The textbook’s authors urge us to keep antitrust pure by continuing to
“focus solely on economic goals—preventing the acquisition, maintenance, or
exercise of market power.”6
In a similar vein, an International Competition Policy Group, formed at
the invitation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, released a Report on March
14, 2017, warning that the use of antitrust law to achieve any objectives other
than “sound, economics-based” goals “would interject harmful uncertainty
into antitrust enforcement, detract from economic welfare, potentially be in
tension with the rule of law, and, importantly, undermine longstanding U.S.
efforts to advocate the consumer welfare approach overseas.”7 The Report
expresses a deep fear of the growing interest in rediscovering antitrust’s lost

5
ANDREW I. GAVIL WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHON B. BAKER & JOSHUA D.
WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 35 (3d ed. 2017). The authors add, “[d]efenders of an economic
approach to antitrust assert that antitrust rules and exemptions guided by noneconomic values are usually inconsistent with economic interests and impose
significant aggregate costs on consumers. They also assert that such rules tend to be
inflexible and prone to over-deterrence.” Id. at 39.
6
Id. at 40. The authors additionally observe:

Although courts sometimes have articulated non-economic goals for
U.S. antitrust law, their reliance on such goals as a source of useful
guidance for deciding particular cases has waned since the early
1970s. Non-economic goals frequently conflict with economic
aims, provide too little guidance for antitrust decision makers, and
arguably are ill-suited to decision-making processes that rely on
adjudication and the adversary system. It is equally important to
appreciate that this was not always the case in the United States, may
still not be the case in some isolated circumstances, and may not be
the case universally in the world today.
Id. at 40–41.
7
International Competition Policy Expert Group: Report and
Recommendations, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Mar. 14, 2017), at 18,
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/icpeg_recommendations_and_report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/L65H-HSNW].
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social, political, and moral values,8 sinisterly noting, “[p]roblematically, in
some matters, competition authorities (including those in the United States)
appear to have pursued investigations well beyond the point where objective
review would indicate either that the suspected conduct did not occur as
initially anticipated, or that such conduct poses no substantial threat to
competition.”9 The Report worrisomely concludes that “the United States
confronts a situation in which many jurisdictions fall far short of employing
an economics-based, consumer welfare-oriented approach to competition law
enforcement focused on preserving a vigorous competitive process.”10

Id. at 21 (“While a number of jurisdictions have begun to speak seriously about
the merits of an economics-based consumer welfare approach, those principles are not
embraced by many other jurisdictions.”). The Report solemnly adds:
8

In addition, even where there is some positive recognition of the
[economic] approach, it is not applied consistently in case law and
agency decision-making. Too few jurisdictions have prominent
roles for economists trained to understand problems of industrial
organization. Even jurisdictions regarded as mature, like the
European Union, have created important roles for economists only
recently, and the impact of economic analysis on the resolution of
specific matters remains unclear. . . . Without the discipline of close
review by expert economists and other officials empowered and
motivated to apply rigorous scrutiny to proposed enforcement
initiatives, competition authorities often become comfortable with
an unjustifiably more interventionist view of enforcement. . . .
Where this occurs, competition authorities can tend to discount the
costs and disruption that their enforcement activities impose on
legitimate business conduct, give too little weight [to] the costs of
wrongfully condemning conduct that is procompetitive, and
exaggerate the likelihood and consequences of wrongfully
exonerating conduct that might have anticompetitive impact.
Id. at 21–22.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 23. It is important to note that in a “Separate Statement” appended to the
Report, Professor Eleanor Fox observed:
I do not believe that the United States has the one right mold for
antitrust rules and standards or for the antitrust/intellectual property
interface, although much wisdom can be found in U.S. law. In my
view we should respect different views and different circumstances
and thus recognize the legitimacy of other approaches as long as
they are applied with transparency, proportionality, due process, and
non-discrimination.
Id. at 33.
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The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other supporters of neoconservative
American antitrust economics have good reason to be alarmed. Progressive
antitrust scholars increasingly have begun challenging neoconservatives’
ongoing attempts to excise our supposedly “non-economic” historic social,
political, and moral values and goals from our antitrust analyses and
regulations. Professor Marina Lao observes that “some antitrust scholars
would preserve a limited role for other values11 [while] others challenge the
central role of economics more frontally.”12 Distinguished antitrust Professor
Eleanor Fox, for example, has argued that “[i]f pressed to take account of
harms beyond output restraint . . . , jurists may find that they can advance
values of antitrust law—diversity, opportunity, fair process, choice, and fairer
distribution—without also raising the costs of goods and services to
consumers.”13 Professor and former Federal Trade Commission Chairman
Robert Pitofsky similarly adds, “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to
exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.”14 Suggesting
11

Lao, supra note 4, at 649–50 (citing Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051–52 (1979)) (agreeing that economic
considerations should be paramount in antitrust analyses, but arguing that noneconomic political values also must be considered).
12
Id. at 650 (citing Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote
Happiness? 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2575, 3578 (2013) [hereinafter Stucke II]); Stucke
I, supra note 1; Bush, supra note 1, at 281–85; First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2543.
This author similarly has argued at length for a less neoclassical economics-oriented
approach to antitrust. See, e.g., Horton I, supra note 2; Thomas J. Horton, Restoring
American Antitrust’s Moral Arc, 62 S.D. L. REV. 11 (2017) [hereinafter Horton II];
Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of
the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and
Behavioral Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2011) [hereinafter Horton III]; Thomas
J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix: Applying
Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials, 41 U.
BALT. L. REV. 615 (2012) [hereinafter Horton IV].
13
Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision
Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 584 (1986) (emphasis in
original).
14
Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051. Professor Pitofsky explains:
By “political values,” I mean, first, a fear that excessive
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political
pressures, and second, a desire to enhance individual and business
freedom by reducing the range within which private discretion by a
few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third and
overriding political concern is that if the free-market sector of the
economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to
all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so
dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for
the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.
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that “economics and empiricism do not provide answers to all questions arising
in antitrust law,”15 Professor Lao insightfully suggests that it is time for a
discourse that “bring[s] to the fore the ideological underpinnings of the
conservative and liberal divide, and to have a normative conversation based
on the [various] value[s] differences rather than rely on economic theories as
proxies for discussion.”16
The purpose of this Article is to further Professor Lao’s recommended
discourse by tracing Congress’s consistent balancing of social, political,
moral, and economic values and objectives over the course of more than a
century of antitrust legislation. This Article will examine Congress’s
balancing of diverse fundamental values between the passage of: 1) the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890;17 2) the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Acts in 1914;18 3) the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976
(HSR Act);19 4) the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA);20
and 5) the National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004,21
which amended the NCRA to create the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act (NCRPA).
As a starting point, a plethora of outstanding and insightful scholarship
analyzing Congress’s objectives in passing the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC
Acts already exists. Less studied, however, has been Congress’s more recent
antitrust legislation, including the HSR Act and the NCRA. By analyzing such
legislation, the author seeks to show that from Congress’s long-term
perspective, political, social, moral, and economic values are not viewed as
emanating from distinct and rigid ideological spheres. Rather they derive from
interdependent and overlapping fundamental long-term core and shorter-term

Id.
15

Lao, supra note 4, at 684.
Id. at 685; see also Harrison, supra note 2, at 431 (observing that “the primary
function of socio-economics is to ask questions and broaden the discussion”).
17
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7 (2012)).
18
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)); Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
41–58 (2012)); see also Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat.
1125 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18) (amending 38 Stat. 209).
19
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1390, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §18a).
20
National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2012)).
21
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, Title I, §§ 101–108, 118 Stat. 661, 661–65 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301–4306); National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306).
16
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flexible American values. It will be seen that Congress has never identified
any single economic value, such as consumer welfare or allocative efficiency,
as the sole guiding lodestar for American antitrust. Instead, for more than 100
years, Congress has sought to balance a complex set of democratic ideals,
values, and objectives in our antitrust laws.
Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and
blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create
a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and
changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews
some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values
and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and
FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political,
social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust
legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates
undergirding the passage of the HSR Act.24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates
and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004.25
Part III compares Congress’s balancing of social, political, moral and
economic values, goals, and objectives between 1890 and 2004 to show how
our antitrust laws were never intended to identify or pursue any single set of
so-called economic values.26 This Article therefore disputes the currently in
vogue assertions of Judges Posner, Bork, and Easterbrook that “although
noneconomic objectives are frequently mentioned in the legislative histories,
it seems that the dominant legislative intent has been to promote some

22

See infra Part II (discussing congressional intent of historical antitrust
legislation).
23
See infra Part II.A. (highlighting scholarship on congressional balancing of
values regarding antitrust legislation).
24
See infra Part II.B. (detailing congressional debates surrounding HSR Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976).
25
See infra Part II.C. (describing legislative history of NCRA and its subsequent
amendments).
26
See infra Part III. This section builds upon an impressive array of antitrust
scholarship discussing Congress’s blending and balancing of political, moral, social,
and economic values to pursue multiple competition objectives. See, e.g., RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 227–45 (1955) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER I];
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 195 (Vintage
Books 1st ed. 2008) [hereinafter Hofstadter II]; HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 120, 165 (1955);
Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36
YALE L.J. 207, 216–24 (1927); Steven C. Salop, What Consensus? Why Ideology and
Elections Still Matter to Antitrust, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601, 602–07 (2014); Fox, supra
note 13, at 578; Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051–60; Stucke I, supra note 1, at 559–
68; Stucke II, supra note 12, at 2637–44.
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approximation to the economist’s idea of competition viewed as a means
toward the end of maximizing efficiency.”27
Part III argues that in promulgating antitrust legislation, Congress
historically has carefully and judiciously balanced a diverse array of
potentially conflicting fundamental American values.28 In so doing, Congress
has sought to create and bolster an enlightened system of capitalism dedicated
to supporting and encouraging economic growth within a competitive
economic system designed to also protect such sacred American values as
equality of opportunity, diversity, and economic ethics and morality. Congress
has never been concerned that paying homage and deference to our sacred
social, moral, and political values in antitrust legislation would somehow
pollute or dilute America’s economic agenda or values. Rather, Congress has
recognized that a careful balancing and blending of our diverse fundamental
values, goals, and objectives would best protect and promote America’s
economic, political, and social welfare.
Part IV then addresses the issue of whether so-called economic values such
as efficiency and consumer welfare truly are distinct and separable from our
social, political, and moral values.29 Tracing the history and growth of such
economic values and objectives, Part IV describes how they actually are socioeconomic derivatives of nineteenth-century social Darwinism and its attendant
laissez-faire economic philosophies. These ideas are as much about social,
political, and moral philosophies as they are about pure economics.
Recognizing this, Congress has never adopted explicitly or implicitly in its
antitrust regulations the misguided social, political, moral, or economic
philosophies and values of social Darwinism or laissez-faire.30

27

RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 20 (1976)
[hereinafter POSNER III]; see also Robert H. Bork, Legislative History and the Policy
of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26 (1966) [hereinafter Bork II] (concluding that
the legislative history of the Sherman Act showed that Congress was primarily
concerned with enhancing economic efficiency); Frank Easterbrook, Workable
Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook]
(“However you slice the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of
consumers from overcharges. This turns out to be the same program as one based on
‘efficiency.’”).
28
See infra Part III.
29
See infra Part IV (comparing economic values with social, political, and moral
values).
30
But see First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2548–49, 2558 (recognizing that “[t]he
modern Supreme Court has come to be unmoored from any sense of legislative
direction of judicial decision making, when it comes to interpreting the antitrust laws,”
but arguing “that Congress has acquiesced in its own marginalization”); Harrison,
supra note 2, at 422 (“The guiding principle of today’s antitrust approach of the
Supreme Court is much more aligned with doing nothing . . . . In the end, it reflects a
deep-seated distrust of government involvement in economic affairs.”).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE VALUES REFLECTED IN OUR ANTITRUST
LAWS
For nearly 100 years, numerous brilliant and accomplished antitrust
scholars have fiercely debated Congress’s antitrust objectives as expressed in
the early antitrust statutes’ legislative histories. This is neither surprising nor
troubling, since America has never been “a nation placidly evolving without
serious disagreements.”31 Much of this scholarship seeks to shed light upon
the “complex and diverse intellectual influences”32 emanating from a variety
of “implicit or explicit community values.”33
The difficulty in interpreting Congress’s legislative intent is exacerbated
by several key factors. First, antitrust law inevitably “encounters contradictory
attitudes by those affected by it.”34 Second, economic decision-making
invariably requires normative values judgments.35 And third, different
31

ERIC FONER, Introduction to RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT xxv (Beacon Press ed., 1992) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER III
(Beacon Press ed., 1992)]. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM
IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1944) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER III].
32
William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 11 (2007) (observing that current antitrust policy debates “incorrectly
attribute[] antitrust perspectives to a single source when they instead stemmed from
more complex and diverse intellectual influences”).
33
Allen Fels, A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Structure, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 489,
498 (2010) (observing that “[t]he community is the ultimate arbiter of public value”
and that “[i]ts preferences are expressed through legislation, rules and other directives
. . . as well as many implicit or explicit community values.”).
34
Id. at 499.
35
See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY xiii (1995) (arguing that economics “is grounded in social
life and cannot be understood separately from the larger question of how modern
societies organize themselves”); Walter Adams & James Brock, Antitrust, Ideology
and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 327 [hereinafter
Adams & Brock I] (arguing that “resolving antitrust issues calls for judgment. And
that judgment is—and must be—informed as much by sociopolitical values as it is by
economic facts and theory”); Jennifer K. Alexander, The Concept of Efficiency: An
Historical Analysis, in PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES,
vol. 9, 1007–08 (Anthonie Meijers ed., 2009) (“[E]fficiency in this common sense
generally denotes approval: better efficient than not.); Oliver Goodenough, Values,
Mechanism Design, and Fairness, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 228 (Paul J. Zak, ed., 2008) (“Economic theorists have
generally underestimated values as critical elements in human choice and behavior.”);
Foer, supra note 3, at 116 (arguing that “economics is a social science, not a natural
science and definitely not a subdiscipline of mathematics”); Fox, supra note 13, at 576
(arguing that “the economic analyst called upon to aid in the solution of legal problems
is forced to make judgments that economics does not and cannot provide”); Lao, supra
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individuals “bring different ideological views to bear on antitrust
enforcement.”36 Consequently, it is hardly surprising or troubling that there
are so many conflicting scholarly interpretations of the legislative histories of
America’s core antitrust statutes.
A. America’s Early Antitrust Laws
Given the diverse array of excellent scholarship addressing the legislative
histories of Congress’s early antitrust legislation, including the Sherman,
Clayton, and FTC Acts, a full review is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, a brief review of that scholarship will be useful for demonstrating
how Congress historically has balanced a diverse array of often conflicting
fundamental implicit and explicit American communal and market values in
seeking to regulate American economic competition.
Turning first to scholarship focusing on Congress’s economic objectives,
neoconservatives today frequently proclaim that a broad consensus has
congealed around their view that Congress crafted its early antitrust statutes as
consumer welfare prescriptions designed to maximize consumer welfare and
allocative efficiency.37 In the words of Judge Robert Bork, “[t]he only
legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer
welfare.”38 Indeed, neoconservative scholars have been outspoken in
proclaiming that Congress was necessarily focused on increasing economic
efficiency.39
note 4, at 666 (arguing that “it is almost inevitable that consciously or unconsciously,
ideology will come into play in one’s approach to exclusionary conduct”); Stucke I,
supra note 1, at 604 (“Even if antitrust technocrats, for normative reasons, limit
antitrust to economic goals, they cannot avoid noneconomic values”).
36
Salop, supra note 26 at 602; see also Lao, supra note 4, at 666 (discussing how
ideology and values impact one’s “perspectives on the proper role of antitrust”).
37
See sources cited supra notes 3 and 27; see also 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
149 n.2 (1980); P. AREEDA, L. KAPLOW & A. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 486 (6th ed. 2004) (discussing the arguments that “the
noneconomic motives for [antitrust] legislation are less important than serving the
economic function or that pursuing competitive prices and efficiency actually serves
the broader objectives to the extent Congress intended;” and that “the difficulty of
formulating standards to serve the broader objectives may leave the courts, by default,
with those of the economic model of competition: allocative efficiency, innovation,
and consumer welfare”); Bork II, supra note 27, at 7.
38
BORK I, supra note 3, at 51.
39
See, e.g., POSNER III, supra note 27, at 20; Easterbrook I, supra note 27, at
1703–04; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections
on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1980) (“Preoccupation with
efficiency is changing the law.”). Professor Sullivan adds:
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A number of scholars have accepted the premise “that Congress passed the
antitrust laws to further economic objectives,”40 but disputed the precise nature
of Congress’s economic objectives. Professor Robert Lande, for example, has
brilliantly argued that Congress passed the early antitrust laws primarily to
promote economic “objectives of a distributive rather than of an efficiency
nature.”41 Professor Lande extensively reviewed the legislative histories of the
Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts, and eloquently defended his thesis “that the
antitrust laws were passed primarily to further what may be called a
distributive goal, the goal of preventing unfair acquisitions of consumers’
wealth by firms with market power.”42
Professor and economist Jonathan Baker more recently argued that “[t]he
best interpretation of the understanding of antitrust’s original generation is
neither Judge Bork’s nor Professor Lande’s.”43 Instead, Professor Baker
believes that “the Sherman Act was understood then as protecting natural
rights to economic liberty, security of property, and the process of free and
competitive exchange from artificial interference by private actors . . . .”44
Ultimately, Professor Baker asserts that “[s]o long as competition policy
remains the product of a political understanding aimed at capturing economic
efficiencies, as it should, economic analysis will remain the essence of antitrust
policy, enforcement, and litigation.”45
The current Supreme Court has issued several revisionist decisions.
It has expanded the scope of the rule of reason and reduced the reach
of per se rules, thus calling for fewer rules and more analysis. At
the same time it has narrowed inquiry under the rule of reason. Only
competitive effects are relevant. This usually means efficiency
effects. “Reason,” in antitrust, is becoming blind to other social
consequences.
Id.
40
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68 (1982).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 69–70; see also id. at 151 (“Congress wanted to encourage economic
efficiency and to ensure that the fruits of this efficiency were passed on to consumers,
but efficiency was never its primary goal. Congress attempted to accomplish its
overriding redistributive aims in such a way that the benefits of modern productivity
would still be realized.”).
43
Jonathon B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and
Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2177 (2013).
44
Id. Professor Baker further posits that “the dispute over antitrust’s origins is
largely irrelevant to the goals of modern antitrust because the contemporary Supreme
Court has accepted the Sherman Act’s ‘dynamic potential.’” Id. (citing Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988)).
45
Id. at 2196. Professor Baker adds that his “vision of antitrust’s goals and future
recognizes the political context of antitrust while simultaneously embracing the central
role of economics in the field.” Id.
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Professor Robert Pitofsky agrees with Professor Baker that economic
concerns should “remain paramount,”46 and urges that “[t]he issue among most
serious people has never been whether non-economic considerations should
outweigh significant long-term economies of scale . . . ” in interpretations of
the antitrust laws and concrete antitrust analyses.47 But he cautions that “the
trend toward use of an exclusively economic approach to antitrust analysis
excludes important political considerations that have in the past been seen as
relevant by Congress and the courts.”48 Coming from a somewhat different
economic direction, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp recognize the
numerous legislative statements of concern “that the trusts (a) raised prices and
(b) injured others.”49 But Congress’s “most important and perhaps most
troublesome conclusion is that while the framers of the Sherman Act were
intent on condemning ‘monopoly,’ they saw the principal injury of monopoly
as reaching competitors rather than consumers . . . .”50 Turning to other early
antitrust legislation, Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp note that their
legislative histories “offer little aid in identifying the fundamental interests that
antitrust policy should protect[,]”51 and attribute to the legislative histories
“little weight on the fundamental question of whether economic efficiency,
injury to competitors, or some alternative ‘populist’ goal should guide antitrust
policy.”52 Consequently, they go on to chide judges “[who] sometimes talk as
if Congress has already decided the [antitrust] question before them.”53

46

Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1075.
Id. at 1051.
48
Id. at 1075. Professor Pitofsky adds, “[s]uch considerations as the fear that
excessive concentration of economic power will foster antidemocratic political
pressures, the desire to reduce the range of private discretion by a few in order to
enhance individual freedom, and the fear that increased governmental intrusion will
become necessary if the economy is dominated by a few, can and should be feasibly
incorporated into the antitrust question.” Id.
49
P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 43 (4th ed. 2013).
50
Id. at 42–43. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp additionally observe, “[a]
substantial history of sources other than the legislative debates suggests that the
proponents of the Sherman Act were significantly more concerned about injury to
competitors than injury to consumers.” Id. at 55.
51
Id. at 62.
52
Id. at 63. The authors emphasize “that the common law process of making
[antitrust] law ultimately was both intended by the antitrust enactments and has
occurred.” Id. at 64.
53
Id. The authors believe that attempts to derive judicial decisions from the
antitrust acts’ legislative histories “can be mischievous when it is a substitute for
thought and analysis. The judge who really thinks that Congress has already decided
the matter at issue is not likely to think very long or hard about the conclusion, for
which he erroneously supposes that he is not responsible.” Id.
47
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Other scholars and commentators have focused on the various implied and
explicit social, political, and moral values that drove our early antitrust
legislation. Perhaps most famously, historian Richard Hofstadter has observed
that monopolies and trusts were viewed as violating Progressives’ “inherited
precepts and their moral preferences.”54 As a result:
The Progressive case against business organization was not
confined to economic considerations, nor even to the more
intangible sphere of economic morals. Still more widely felt
was a fear that the great business combinations, being the only
center of wealth and power, would be able to lord it over all
other interests and thus put an end to traditional American
democracy.55
Professor Hofstadter saw America’s early “antimonopoly tradition” as
resting “intellectually upon [both] classical economic theory and upon the
pluralism of American democratic thought.”56 Consequently, he opined, the
original goals of antitrust were economic, political, and social.57 Professor
Hofstadter ironically added, “[a]mong the three, the economic goal was the
most cluttered with uncertainties, so much so that it seems to be no
exaggeration to regard antitrust as being essentially a political rather than an
economic enterprise.”58
Professor Hofstadter built upon the work of Wisconsin Professor Hans B.
Thorelli, who recognized in 1955 that the study of economic policy “runs the
risk of becoming sterile unless a synthesis is attempted from time to time on
the basis of knowledge made available and systematized by such differing
social sciences as law, economics, history, political science, and the study of
54

HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 243.
Id. at 227. Professor Hofstadter added that Progressives, “were trying, in short,
to keep the benefits of the emerging organization of life and yet to retain the scheme
of individualistic virtues that [business] organization was destroying.” Id. at 217.
56
Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in
HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 195.
57
Id. at 199–200.
58
Id. at 200. Professor Hofstadter elaborated:
55

The second class of goals was political; the antitrust principle was
intended to block private accumulations of power and protect
democratic government. The third was social and moral; the
competitive process was believed to be a kind of disciplinary
machinery for the development of character, and the
competitiveness of the people—the fundamental stimulus to
national morale—was believed to need protection.
Id.

194

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 2

public opinion.”59 Noting that Congress “considered one antimonopoly bill
after another without ever . . . calling on the advice of professional
economists,”60 Professor Thorelli opined that solid antitrust analyses were
“eminently a matter of values.”61 Indeed, Professor Thorelli felt that the early
American trusts and monopolies engendered “widespread public discontent
and frustration,” as a result of the “conflict between some of the most ingrained
ideas of the American people on the nature and workings of the political
economy and the actual economic, technical, and institutional developments
in certain fields . . . .”62
Other antitrust scholars have picked up these themes. For example,
Professor Rudolph Peritz has posited that antitrust legislation had to deal with
“an underlying conflict, a fundamental disagreement about the political
economy of competition. . . . between factions holding opposing views of
society.”63 Professor Peritz believed that “[i]n a fundamental sense, current
antitrust policy reflects longstanding tensions between public policies favoring
competitive markets and those favoring private rights of property and
contract.”64 Criticizing the manner in which antitrust’s “political sphere has
come to be identified as an economic domain,”65 Professor Peritz urged that

59

THORELLI, supra note 26, at vii.
Id. at 120.
61
Id. at viii (“Just where and how the balance between principles of cooperation
and competition should be struck in different fields is, of course, eminently a matter
of values.”).
62
Id. at 165. Presaging Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, Professor Thorelli
insightfully added, “[t]he fact that numerous and variegated attempts have been made
to ‘map’ the intentions of the 51st Congress without any one investigator producing
results generally accepted as conclusive appears to confirm the view that complete
success is unattainable.” Id. at 214.
63
RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY,
RHETORIC, LAW 34 (rev. ed. 2000). Professor Peritz explained:
60

On the one side, the Literalists believed that the policy directing
the antitrust laws should rest upon free and unrestricted
competition among roughly equal market participants, among
independent entrepreneurs or free workmen, whether or not the
consequence in any particular transaction was fair or reasonable.
On the other [hand], the advocates of a Rule of Reason urged that
antitrust policy should tolerate large consolidations of capital and
allow private agreements that restrain trade when the agreements
protect a fair return on property or some other traditional exercise
of freedom of contract.
Id. (alteration in original).
64
Id. at 305.
65
Id. at 302.
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“[f]or competition policy to remain a durable good, it must reflect a dialogical
sense of political economy.”66
A diverse array of progressive antitrust scholars and commentators agree
that our antitrust laws reflect a careful balancing of diverse social, political,
moral, and economic goals. Professor William S. Comanor, for example,
observes that “[a]ntitrust is not immune to the clash of conflicting interests,
and indeed it represents, to a substantial extent, a political accommodation
among various groups.”67 Thus, “[t]hose who look for a single-minded
purpose in antitrust are inevitably frustrated.”68
Professors Maurice Stucke, Eleanor Fox, and Harry First concur.
Professor Stucke, for example, has repeatedly described how antitrust
historically has sought to promote diverse political, social, and moral goals in
order to strengthen America’s economic system.69 Professor Fox similarly has
described Congress’s antitrust goals of promoting and protecting “pluralism,
entrepreneurial freedom, opportunity to compete, access to the market,
freedom from exploitation, and fair process.”70 Meanwhile, Professor Harry
66

Id. at 303; see also Sullivan, supra note 39, at 4. Professor Sullivan similarly
observed:
The Warren Court was the custodian of a multivalued antitrust
tradition. To that Court, the idea of competition included political
and social objectives. Among those were easing market access,
protecting dealer independence, promoting good faith in
transactions, and correcting extreme disparities in bargaining power.
The Warren Court also was interested in assuring, on grounds of
equity and fairness, and regardless of supposed impact on resource
allocation, that prices be related to cost. It sought each of these goals
as an end in itself. Competition could foster all of them.
Id. at 4. Professor Sullivan added, “[c]ontext was important. The interests involved
were identified: the strength of values pointing toward one resolution was measured
against the strength of those pointing toward another.” Id.
67
William S. Comanor, Antitrust in a Political Environment, 27 ANTITRUST
BULL. 733, 734 (1982).
68
Id. at 751. Professor Comanor adds that antitrust “can never be a precise policy
tool designed to achieve specific objectives: whether the economist’s concept of
economic efficiency or some other.” Id.
69
See, e.g., Stucke II, supra note 27, at 2580. Professor Stucke adds that
“competition law has had, and will always have, multiple economic, political, social,
and moral objectives.” Id. at 2578. Indeed, “[c]ompetition policy historically sought
to promote political, social, and moral values of fair competition, dispersal of
economic power, and promoting economic opportunity and individual autonomy.” Id.
at 2637; see also Stucke I, supra note 1, at 560–62 (enumerating diverse social,
political, and moral concerns that the Supreme Court has gleaned over the years in
reviewing the Sherman Act’s legislative history).
70
Fox, supra note 13, at 566–67. Looking specifically at the Clayton Act,
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First persuasively posits that “[s]omething other than technical analysis is thus
needed to make [antitrust] decisions. And the choice of the core concepts on
which to focus antitrust enforcement is the product of political values, not
technical decisions.”71
What are we to make of all this outstanding legal and historical scholarship
reaching conflicting conclusions as to Congress’s legislative intents in its early
antitrust statutes? Perhaps the reason that no definitive single conclusion or
set of conclusions can be reached is that Congress, like it so often must do, had
to balance different social, political, moral and economic values, objectives
and visions in order to pass antitrust legislation that could pass the tests of
time. Reviewing the extensive legislative histories and debates, it can be seen
that the proponents of our early antitrust statutes shared such explicit and
implied values as a belief in fair competition (equality of opportunity),
economic diversity, and economic fairness through government oversight.
Meanwhile, the opponents shared such express and implied values as
efficiency through economic concentration, freedom of contract, protection of
private property rights, and neo-Darwinian notions of “survival of the fittest.”
Nearly 120 years after the passage of the Sherman Act, these battles rage on
with no definitive conclusions yet attained. As observed in Parts II.B. and C.
below, more recent congressional antitrust debates have sparked similar values
clashes, and required Congress to carefully and delicately balance diverse
social, political, moral and economic goals and objectives.72
B. American Values and the Premerger Notification Requirements of the
HSR Act of 1976
Decades of efforts to reform, modernize, and improve the Progressive
Professor Fox finds that “[i]ts major goals were to preserve diversity, to decentralize
power for social and political reasons, and probably, but less explicitly, to prevent
exploitation of consumers.” Id. at 578. Professor Fox adds that “[i]n short, allocative
efficiency was never a self-conscious goal of the Congresses that enacted and
strengthened the antitrust laws.” Id. at 566.
71
Harry First, Bring Back Antitrust!, THE NATION (May 15, 2008),
https://www.thenation.com/article/bring-back-antitrust/
[https://perma.cc/YX4AVHY4]; see also First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2544 (“The institutional aspects of
today’s antitrust enterprise . . . are increasingly out of balance, threatening the
democratic, economic, and political goals of the antitrust laws.”); Frederick M. Rowe,
The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law of
Economics 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1567 (1984) (“Yet antitrust, as a ‘charter of freedom,’
can perform a vital role for an entrepreneurial, pluralistic society: to mitigate the
paradox of order and change, maintaining a balance of enterprise and power serving
the felt needs of a given age. Consonant with its formative themes of pragmatism,
pluralism, and distrust of power, antitrust is hardly definable by monopoly meters that
count what is assumed, not shown, to exist.”).
72
See infra Parts II.B.–C. (illuminating recent antitrust congressional debates).
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Era’s Clayton Act73 and the subsequent 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act74
culminated in 1976 when Congress passed, following furious debating,
maneuvering, and infighting, the HSR Act.75 President Ford reluctantly signed
the HSR Act into law on September 30, 1976,76 although he attempted to mask
his reluctance by saying that he was “pleased to see [the bill] enacted into
law.”77
The HSR Act is designed to provide the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies “with the opportunity to review competitively-relevant information
about large mergers and acquisitions—and to seek to enjoin or remedy them
if, in the agency’s view, they would create or enhance market power or
73

Section 7 of the original 1914 Clayton Act prevented companies from acquiring
the stock of rival companies where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914,
Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was
designed to prevent economic concentrations through acquisition in their incipiency.
See United States v. United Machinery Shoe Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920),
aff’d, 258 U.S. 451 (1921). Unfortunately, companies frequently used asset purchases
to completely evade the Act’s objectives. See, e.g., Arrow-Hart Hegemen Elec. Co.
v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 291 U.S. 587, 595 (1934); Lande, supra note 40, at 130.
74
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Pub L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (amending
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 to state in part: “No person engaged in
Commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire . . . the whole or any
part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the county, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”) Congress passed
the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act to close the Clayton Act’s asset purchase loophole, and
to further broaden the Clayton Act to help stem what it perceived to be a “rising tide
of economic concentration in the American economy.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 315–23 (1962). The Brown Shoe Court emphasized that Section
7 of the Clayton Act is to be applied to mergers and acquisitions where the “trend to a
lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its incipiency.” Id. at 317;
see also Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 305–07 (1960) (discussing the “set of value
premises” that drove the Celler-Kefauver Act; and observing that “none of the
justifications for mergers by big companies were accorded any significance by
Congress”); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of
Economic ‘Objectivity’: Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger
Policy?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 273–74 (1985); Lande, supra note 40, at 137–
40; Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766,
779–80 (1952).
75
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, §
201, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)).
76
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976: Statement by the
President on Signing H.R. 8532 Into Law, Sept. 30, 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 40, 1423 (Oct. 4, 1976) [hereinafter Presidential Statement of Sept. 30, 1976].
77
Id. at 1424.
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facilitate its exercise—before the merger or acquisition occurs.”78 Under Title
II’s premerger notification provision, companies with the requisite respective
net assets or annual sales are required to notify the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) before merging.79
Once the proper premerger notification papers are filed, the FTC and the
DOJ have 30 days to decide whether to ask for more information or to allow
the merger or acquisition to proceed.80 If the government quickly decides that
there are no competitive problems with the acquisition, it can grant “early
termination,” and allow the merger to proceed before the 30 days have
passed.81 Conversely, if the government believes there may be a competitive
problem, it can issue a “Second Request” requiring the parties to submit
additional information.82 The government’s Second Request stops the clock,
and stays the proposed acquisition while the parties gather the information
necessary to respond.83 “Requests for additional information . . . generally
include both interrogatories and requests to produce documents, and are often
far-reaching in their scope.”84
After the parties have fully responded to the government’s Second
Request, the government has an additional 30 days to decide whether to allow

78
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 356 (8th
ed. 2017). “The HSR Act requires the parties to notify the DOJ and the FTC before
consummating the proposed transaction and to observe the applicable waiting period.
Notification requirements are triggered by ‘size-of-person’ and ‘size-transaction’ tests,
so smaller transactions do not trigger HSR filing requirements.” ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST
ISSUES 13 (4th ed. 2015). The FTC has issued implementing regulations and forms
that can be found in the Federal Register and the FTC’s website. See, e.g., Premerger
Notification
Program,
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program
[https://perma.cc/EWU4-ANA4] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018); see also 18 U.S.C § 18a
(2012) (Premerger notification and waiting period). For an excellent discussion of the
Act’s requirements, see ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 78, at
405–13.
79
See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (“Filing.”). The precise jurisdictional requirements
include: 1) a commerce test; 2) a size-of-the-parties test; and 3) a size-of-thetransaction test. Id.
80
Id. § 18a(b) (“Waiting period.”).
81
Id. § 18a(b)(2). The waiting time for cash tender offers is only 15 days. Id. §
18(b)(1).
82
Id. § 18a(e)(1)–(2).
83
Id. (“Additional information; waiting period extensions.”).
84
S. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANTITRUST
IMPROVEMENTS ACT: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS §
1.03(2)(a)(i) (rev. ed., 2003) [hereinafter “AXINN ET AL.”].
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the acquisition to proceed unchallenged.85 If the government decides,
however, that the effect of the proposed acquisition “may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” the government may file
a motion for a preliminary injunction blocking the acquisition in a “United
States district court for the judicial district within which the respondent resides
or carries on business.”86
1. The Legislative History of the HSR Act
President Ford’s simple statement on September 30, 1976, that he was
“pleased to see [the HSR Act] enacted into law,”87 and the Judiciary
Committee’s straightforward Statement of Interest, masked a furious
legislative battle and heavy Administration infighting against the bill that
caused the final bill to be substantially changed and “watered down” from its
early iterations.88 Describing the intense and sometimes bitter legislative
debates, Senator Edward Kennedy observed on September 8, 1976, that
“[p]erhaps only the tax reform bill has been the subject of such extensive
committee and floor consideration as this legislation.”89
Consistent attempts to reform the Clayton Act by requiring companies to
notify the government before they merged had been going on since at least
1938.90 Thus, bills requiring advance notifications were introduced in 1938,
1943, and 1946, “but never came to a vote in either the House or Senate.” 91
Additional reform attempts suffered similar fates due to intense opposition
from business interests in 1956, 1961, and 1967.92
Finally, in March 1975, Senator Phillip Hart of Michigan, a progressive
protégé of Senator Estes Kefauver, made it one of his final missions to see
meaningful antitrust reforms enacted. As Chairman of the Antitrust and
85
15 U.S.C. § 18a(e); 16 C.F.R. §§ 803.10, 803.20 (2017). In the case of cash
tender offers, the additional waiting period is only ten days. Furthermore, in the case
of tender offers, only compliance by the acquiring party, as opposed to both parties, is
required to restart the waiting period. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(2).
86
15 U.S.C § 18; id. § 18a(f) (“Preliminary injunctions; hearings.”).
87
Presidential Statement of Sept. 30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1424.
88
Senator Abourezk, a leading supporter of the bill, noted that in June of 1976,
he had been “opposed to any kind of compromise. But due to the illness of Senator
Philip A. Hart [cancer], who was no longer physically able to keep up with the pace at
that time—because this is Senator Hart’s bill . . .—a number of us who were involved
in the legislation then agreed to go ahead with the weakening process.” 122 CONG.
REC. 28,569 (1976). Senator Gary Hart of Colorado similarly observed, “I will vote
for H.R. 8532 despite the fact that I am disappointed at the compromises which had to
be made during its consideration in the Senate.” Id. at 29,163.
89
Id. at 29,334.
90
See AXINN ET AL., supra note 84, § 2.02.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, he
introduced, in March 1975, Senate Bill 1284, a seven-title omnibus antitrust
reform package.93 It was well known that Senator Hart was suffering with
terminal cancer, which gave his hard-fought battle for passage of his Bill a
special poignancy and inspired the Bill’s proponents.94 Nevertheless, Senator
Hart’s Bill faced hostile and intense opposition over the next 18 months, and
could not have been passed without substantial compromises and reductions
in the Bill’s scope, including the elimination of four of its original titles.95
From the time that Senator Hart introduced his premerger notification Title
in the Senate, and hearings began in the Antitrust Subcommittee in May 1975,
the opposition from the Ford Administration and leading conservative
Republicans, such as Senator Hruska of Nebraska and Senator Thurmond of
South Carolina, was spirited.96 The opponents made sure that numerous
leading voices of the business community were permitted to appear and
express “their strong opposition to the entire concept of preacquisition
notification and to the specific provisions of Title V.”97
Although the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee ultimately favorably
reported Title V to the full Senate by a vote of ten to five,98 the Minority Views,
93
Id. The premerger notification requirements were contained in Title V of the
original bill. Other Titles included a Declaration of Policy (Title I); Antitrust Civil
Process Act amendments (Title II); Federal Trade Commission Act amendments (Title
III); parens patriae amendments (Title IV); a section affecting nolo contendere (“no
contest”) pleas in Clayton Act cases (Title VI); and various amendments, including an
expanding of Section 7 of the Clayton Act’s jurisdiction (Title VII). See id. at n.14.
94
See Senator Philip A. Hart Dies at 64; Was Called ‘Conscience of Senate’, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 1976), http://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/27/archives/senator-philipa-hart-dies-at-64-was-called-conscience-of-senate.html
[https://perma.cc/U3XXJATV] (“Mr. Hart . . . did not seek re‐election in 1976 because he was suffering from
cancer.”).
95
In the final Bill, Title 1 “expand[ed] the civil investigating powers of the
Antitrust Division.” Presidential Statement of Sept. 30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1424.
Title II covered premerger notification, and Title III “permit[ted] State attorneys
general to bring antitrust suits on behalf of the citizens of their States to recover treble
damages.” Id. President Ford noted his strong opposition to Title III of the final Bill,
but nevertheless signed the Bill in part because “[t]o meet in part my objection,
Congress wisely incorporated a proviso which permits a State to prevent the
applicability of [Title III].” Id.
96
At one point, Senator Kennedy opined that with respect to the rights of the
majority in the Senate, the minority was engaging in an “abuse of those rights.” 122
CONG. REC. 16,939 (1976).
97
AXINN ET AL., supra note 84, § 2.03(1); see also The Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 151–201, 217–38 (1975) (testimony and
proposed statements of J. W. Riehm and J. Randolph Wilson for the Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. and Richard D. Godown, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.)
98
122 CONG. REC. 7,570 (daily ed. May 19, 1976).
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which were printed on May 20, 1976, were caustic and angry.99 As an
example, the Minority Report began by asserting, “Title V would give the
Government arbitrary fiat powers to prevent any business acquisition,
regardless of size or competitive impact, and runs counter to basic antitrust
policies by inhibiting the competitive, efficient formation and allocation of
capital resources.”100 Such heated opposition continued up to the Bill’s final
passage. For instance, on September 7, 1976, Senator Thurmond stated:
I shall vote against this bill with good reasons. . . . It will add
more money to the already bulging pockets of the antitrust
lawyers. It puts more big brotherism in Government. If fails
to achieve balance. It does not require the big unions to follow
the antitrust laws that the proponents thrust on business. It
will hurt the small businessman. It will hurt the consumer.101
Although such intensive opposition did not ultimately block passage of the
Bill, it led to numerous compromises, including reducing the initial stay period
from 60 to 30 days;102 putting the burden of proof on the government in any
preliminary injunction proceeding, and requiring the government to get a stay
from a United States District Court if it wanted to challenge the transaction
after the final 20-day post-Second Request period expired.103 As Senator
Edward Kennedy, a leading proponent, summarized on August 31, 1976:
[T]his whole issue, had been considered in subcommittee with
5 days of hearings, in full committee with 3 days of hearings
and a total record of over 2,000 pages, with weeks of markup
sessions in committee spanning up to 16 hours, with extensive
debate on the floor of the Senate covering 10 days and some
70 votes. . . . We have compromised and compromised and
compromised . . . .104
One week later, Senator Kennedy added:

99
S. REP. NO. 94-803 (1976) (report of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary together
with Minority Views) [hereinafter “Senate Minority Report”].
100
Id. at 205.
101
122 CONG. REC. 29,155 (1976).
102
See id. at 16,479–81 (debating Senate Amendment No. 1747 to change initial
waiting period from 60 to 30 days).
103
See id. at 16,916 (testimony by FTC and DOJ officials stating that the
Administration did not support an “automatic stay” provision). The Senate killed the
proposed automatic stay provision on June 10, 1976. Id. at 17,427.
104
Id. at 28,570.
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Enough is enough, we have compromised the bill down and
down, severely narrowing or even eliminating substantial
portions of the original S. 1284. What remains may not be the
best possible bill, but it is a good one. It will help bring better
enforcement of the antitrust laws. It will be a solid step in the
right direction.105
2. The Political Context of the HSR Act
Political, economic, and institutional factors were especially critical in
influencing the ultimate passage and scope of HSR Title II’s premerger
notification requirements.
a. Political Factors
President Ford originally opposed much of Senator Hart’s seven-title
omnibus antitrust reform Bill, as against the interests of the business
community, but indicated a willingness to support limited aspects of the Bill.
By early 1976, it was becoming clear that President Ford would face a tough
reelection battle in November 1976. For example, the Ford Administration
found itself facing escalating criticism from Democrats over “the quality of
the administration’s antitrust enforcement.”106 President Ford had to balance
such concerns against his fear that he might be defeated in the Republican
primary by the pro-business conservative Ronald Reagan. On April 4, 1976,
the Ford Administration found itself under heavy Washington Post criticism
in an editorial entitled Waffling on Antitrust Laws.107 The editorial began:
President Ford is getting himself into needless trouble over
the antitrust legislation now moving through Congress. It’s
sadly reminiscent of the way he got himself into trouble over
the common situs picketing bill.
In each case the
administration strongly committed itself to the legislation.
Then some months later, after assiduous lobbying by
businessmen, Mr. Ford began to think of reasons for backing
away from it. . . . [T]he legislation is fortunately, very much
alive and the President may decide to think again and sign it.
105

Id. at 29,335.
See, e.g., Editorial, The Antitrust Bill, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1976, reprinted in
122 CONG. REC. 15,958 (1976). The Post noted “the ferocious opposition mounted by
a wide variety of businesses” to antitrust reform, and questioned why “[a]s for the
premerger notification rule, there has been, unaccountably, no action at all” in the
House Judiciary Committee. Id.
107
Editorial, Waffling on Antitrust Laws, WASH. POST, April 4, 1976, reprinted in
122 CONG. REC. 15,957 (1976).
106
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But the stakes are large and the outcome is very much in
doubt.108
The editorial concluded, “Mr. Ford seems to find all the pressures of the
Republican primary elections pushing against a broader enforcement of the
antitrust laws. But he might discover, on further reflection, that they actually
ought to be pushing the other way.”109
Ultimately, once President Ford defeated Governor Reagan in the
Republican primary and found himself facing the populist Jimmy Carter of
Georgia, he grudgingly accepted the recommendations of his political advisors
to sign the final Bill.110 Perhaps to protect his pro-business flanks, President
Ford expressed ambivalence in signing the HSR Act on September 30, 1976:
I believe that far too many important managerial decisions are
made today not by the marketplace responding to the forces
of supply and demand, but by the bureaucrat. Government
regulation is not an effective substitute for vigorous
competition in the American marketplace.111
The impact of the esteemed Senator Hart’s courageous battle against
terminal cancer throughout the debates of 1975 and 1976 cannot be
overemphasized in setting the context for the willingness of Senators on both
sides of the aisle to reach compromises that would allow him to achieve his
final mission, granting him an appropriate send-off. Eulogizing Senator Hart
several months before the final Senate vote on Senate Bill 1284, Senator
Kennedy poignantly observed:
Senator Hart assumed the chairmanship of the Antitrust
Subcommittee almost 13 years ago when antitrust was far
from “in vogue.” . . . It is indeed fitting and proper that—as
108

Id.
Id.
110
“Press reports indicated that the Justice Department, the office of Management
and Budget, and Ford’s political advisors recommended that he sign the bill, while the
Treasury Department, the Small Business Administration, and Attorney General
Edward Levi (in a private communication to President Ford inconsistent with the
official recommendation of his agency) recommended that he veto it.” Joe Sims &
Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust
Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 876 n.44 (1997) (citing Carole Shifrin, Levi
Recommended Veto of Antitrust Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1976, at C10; see also 5
DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA), Sept. 29, 1976, at A-23-24).
111
Presidential
Statement
of
Sept.
30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1423.
109
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Senator Hart concludes this term in the Senate—we should be
tagged the “Antitrust Congress.”112
The HSR Act’s supporters also showed great perspicacity in bundling into
the final Bill antitrust civil process reform, which the Ford Administration
desired, to make the overall Bill more palatable to its opponents. This
bundling allowed President Ford to crow, as he signed the final Bill, “[t]hese
amendments to the Antitrust Civil Process Act were proposed by my
administration two years ago, and I am pleased to see that the Congress has
finally passed them.”113
b. Economic and Institutional Factors Surrounding the HSR Act
Changing macroeconomic factors were crucial to setting the context for
the debates over the HSR Act. These included the ongoing transition from a
domestic to an increasingly international economy, the continuing
development of “allocative efficiency” theories at the University of Chicago
and other conservative institutions, and increasing inflation.
As the economy shifted throughout the 1970s toward increasing
internationalization and globalization, many businesspersons came to believe
that American corporations would have to get bigger and stronger to
successfully compete in the global marketplace. Senator Fannin of Arizona
cogently summarized the rationale behind Republican opposition to any
domestic governmental restraints on mergers and acquisitions by complaining
that American companies could not fairly compete with merged companies
from such countries as Germany, Japan, and France.114 Aligned against this
112
113
114

122 CONG. REC. 17,559 (1976).
Presidential Statement of September 30, 1976, supra note 76, at 1424.
122 CONG. REC. 16,936 (1976). Senator Fannin stated:
Mr. President, we have many reasons to try to assist in the
formation of capital today. I have mentioned the great need in the
energy industry because I do feel that this is something that is very
close to home to all of us here in Congress. We are daily trying to
get greater development of these energy resources. But it takes a
tremendous amount of capital formation, and what we are doing, if
this title V is adopted, is going contrary to the work that is being done
in so many committees.
It is my feeling that we must be competitive in our industries, not
only within our country but as far as the competitive position we
should be in with other countries of the world. We find ourselves
lacking in that ability many times because of our inability to join our
companies together to bring about an operation that can compete. We
are in competition with countries such as Japan, West Germany, and
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“bigger is better” philosophy stood progressives such as Senators Hart,
Kennedy, and Abourezk, who believed that America could only remain strong
through continuing economic innovation and rigorous domestic competition,
which would be best provided by a diverse array of smaller and more
aggressive competitors.115
Conservative senators such as Jacob Javits further expressed concerns that
overly zealous enforcement of the antitrust laws was discouraging “the
investment of private capital of the United States and other developed
countries in the developing countries.”116 Senator Javits felt this revealed “a
deep conflict between our antitrust philosophy and other major national
policies when there should be coordination and thoughtful accommodation
between them.”117 Senator Javits additionally observed that many experts had
concluded that “uncertainty about the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law
extraterritorially [was] the greatest single inhibitor to increased foreign trade
and investment.”118 Senator Kennedy quickly and ably sought to address such
concerns by citing to letters from the American Life Insurance Association,
which stated, “[w]e are satisfied that . . . title V does not adversely affect the
capital markets,” and “title V would not adversely affect the investment
programs of mutual funds in the capital markets.”119
Ultimately, the developing philosophical values battle between those
favoring economic concentration and efficiency, and the proponents of
economic diversity and opportunity, also played a major role in the HSR Act
debates. According to antitrust commentators Joe Sims and Deborah
Herman120:
By 1976, economic efficiency was increasingly elbowing
“big is bad” out of its position as the principal framework for
France, countries that do not have all those restrictions that we have.
In fact, in Japan, for instance, they have their government going hand
in glove with their industries to see that they are in a position to
compete in the other countries of the world. In fact, we have many
reasons to be very jealous of what they are doing because it is
working a great hardship on our industries and on the consumers in
this country.
Id.
115

See id. at 15,310–14, 17,559.
Id. at 16,712.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 16,937.
120
Both Sims and Herman served as Deputy Assistant Attorneys General for
Antitrust in Republican administrations. Sims served under President Ford, and
Herman in the Bush II Administration. Herman also later served as the Chairman of
the FTC. Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 865 n.3, 865–66.
116
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antitrust analysis. The Supreme Court was starting to reflect
this new learning in nonmerger cases like Sylvania, and even
to some extent in merger cases like General Dynamics and
Marine Bancorporation. The old antitrust was clearly losing
steam.121
Such developing neoconservative economic thinking undergirded the
opponents’ arguments that the “so-called ‘merger problem’ [was] a myth,” and
that the Act “contradict[ed] fundamental antitrust principles favoring fluid
resource mobility in free and competitive markets.”122 The Act’s opponents
cited to a June 8, 1976 editorial in the Phoenix, Arizona Republic morning
newspaper lambasting “Marxian principles,” and argued that “the fundamental
process that has been eroding our liberties is the politicization of economic
decisions . . . .”123
Countering this developing neoconservative economic doctrine was the
idea that big indeed often is bad. Senator Abourezk blasted the “realities of
the concentration of economic power.”124 He explained that although there
were over 40,000 manufacturing corporations in the United States in 1976,
“the 200 largest control two-thirds of all manufacturing assets. That’s a greater
share of assets than the thousand largest manufacturing corporations controlled
in 1941.”125 Senator Abourezk was further troubled that “[i]ndustries in which
four or fewer firms control 50 percent or more of sales account for one-fourth
to one-third of all manufacturing sales,” and that “[w]e now have five
corporations whose sales exceed the total budget of our most populous state,
California.”126
A third macroeconomic context in the HSR debate, as the Presidential
election of 1976 approached, was the economic ravages caused by rising
inflation. Proponents of the Bill contended that by helping to control
monopolies, the Bill would control inflation. As an example, Senator
Abourezk argued on May 25, 1976, “I firmly believe that this concentration of
economic power is one of the root causes of the country’s present economic
difficulties. This concentration of power is the structural cause of our
simultaneous inflation and depression.”127 Echoing this strong rhetoric, the
Washington Post editorialized on September 16, 1976, “[s]tronger antitrust
enforcement is a weapon against inflation. The bill deserves the votes of those
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Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 872.
Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 212.
123
122 CONG. REC. 16,936 (1976) (quotations omitted) (citing Editorial, Antitrust
Government, Ariz. Republic, June 8, 1976).
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Id. at 15,313.
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Id. at 15,313–14.
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Id. at 15,314.
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congressmen who believe in open markets and greater competition in the
American economy.”128
In response, Senator Thurmond argued that unfettered private enterprise
was the best way to fight inflation. He asked:
How are we going to increase employment if we do not have
business growth, if we do not expand the economy and
provide more jobs . . . ? [P]rivate enterprise will provide most
of the jobs for our people if we will unshackle private
enterprise and quit loading it down with more and more
regulations and harassing it, as is now being done, by so many
agencies of this Government . . . .129
Finally, institutional factors affecting the Courts and the Executive
branch’s antitrust regulatory agencies (the FTC and the DOJ’s Antitrust
Division) also played a key role in catalyzing the passage of the HSR Act.
“The poster child in the legislative debate was the tortured litigation history of
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.”130 As noted in the legislative
history, “the litigation spawned by the El Paso Natural Gas merger lasted
seventeen years, and went to the Supreme Court six times, before the illegallyacquired firm was successfully divested. But the costs—to the firms, the
courts, and the marketplace—were immense.”131 The House Judiciary
Committee concluded:
To avoid the worst of these protracted exercises in futility
is the major purpose of this bill. Merger litigation simply need
not always continue for years and even decades—but if it
takes place after consummation, it generally will, for the
acquiring firm has no incentive to litigate the issues speedily.
In contrast, pre-consummation merger litigation proceeds
rapidly and expeditiously, because all parties have a
paramount interest in the quick resolution of the case.
In sum, the chief virtue of this bill is that its provisions
will help to eliminate endless post-merger proceedings like
128

Editorial, Penalties for Price Fixing, WASH. POST., Sept. 16, 1976, reprinted in
122 CONG. REC. 30,644 (1976).
129
122 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1976).
130
William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 826–27 (1997) (discussing United
States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964)).
131
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 10 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637,
2642.
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the El Paso and Papercraft cases, and replace them with far
more expeditious and effective premerger proceedings. It can
be done, and the savings will be considerable, as the AMAX
case indicates.132
Ultimately, the HSR Act was a quintessential piece of “top down”
legislation. Leaders from the worlds of business, law, and economics, as well
as members of the administration, dominated the hearings. Trade associations
and consumer welfare associations such as the Consumer Federation of
America, which claimed to represent more than 30 million “consumers,” also
appeared.133 Ironically, while both sides claimed to represent the “public
interest,” there was very little record of any public participation other than a
few letters placed in the Congressional Record, which upon close inspection,
appear to be form letters prepared by elite business or consumer
organizations.134 It seems fair to assert that the public, who were most directly
affected by economic concentration, had to hope that their interests were truly
aligned with those of the participating elites.
3. The Underlying Values Assumptions and Premises of the HSR Act’s
Proponents and Opponents
a. Proponents’ Underlying Assumptions for the Bill
As described above, the first key economic assumption held by the
proponents of premerger notification was that the increasing consolidation of
American industry was dangerous. Senator Abourezk and other proponents of
the HSR Act staunchly believed that too much economic concentration was
inherently dangerous. Senator Abourezk noted that: “The rapid trend toward
consolidation is illustrated by the fact that between 1962 and 1968 alone, 110
of the 500 largest industrial firms disappeared in mergers. Between 1948 and
1968, some 1,200 manufacturing companies, each with assets of $10 million
or more, were merged with other firms.”135 Similarly, Senator Kennedy
pointed to a 1966 study chaired by Senator Phillip Hart warning that there was
“a frightening amount of concentration of power in a few corporate hands,
[and] that this had dangerous implications for our social and political, as well
as our economic, welfare.”136 Senator Kennedy further lamented “the almost
daily newspaper stories on how these giant corporations have taken this power
132

Id.
See, e.g., Letter of Consumer Federation of America (Aug. 2, 1976), reprinted
in 122 CONG. REC. 25,056 (1976).
134
See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 15,322–24 (1976) (citing a number of letters from
businessmen addressed to Senator Thurmond).
135
Id. at 15,314.
136
Id. at 17,559.
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and used it to corrupt and illegally influence governments and to destroy many
of our traditional values . . . .”137
Premerger notification opponents attacked this economic assumption as
the “conjur[ing] up [of] a non-existent ‘merger problem.’” In their Senate
Minority Subcommittee Report of May 20, 1976, they claimed “[t]he assertion
that the alleged ‘concentrated structure of American industry . . . in major part
stems from mergers and acquisitions’ is not only unsupported by the record,
but is contrary to fact.”138
A corollary to the HSR Act’s proponents’ assumption that economic
consolidation was increasing was a growing belief that the resultant corporate
power was increasingly undeserved. In introducing Senate Bill 1284 to the
Senate on March 21, 1975, Senator Hart observed in part:
[C]urrently $1 out of every $4 consumers spend goes to buy
products produced by a concentrated industry. Much of this
concentration developed not from hardnose competition but
from gobbling up a competitor rather than going out and
establishing new competition.139
A second key assumption of the proponents of premerger notification was
that absent such notification, many illegal mergers would occur before the
government had a realistic chance to challenge them.140 Several commentators
have challenged this assumption. For example, Sims and Herman “[did] not
find it plausible that any truly significant transaction [would] escape detection
in these days of intense media scrutiny and strategic complaints by
competitors.”141 The HSR Act’s opponents also argued that “[s]ince 1969 an
FTC program [had effectively] required premerger notification of proposed
mergers involving large companies.”142
Finally, the HSR Act’s proponents believed that the Bill ultimately would
apply only to “the very largest corporate mergers—about the 150 largest out
137

Id.
Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 215.
139
121 CONG. REC. 8,143 (1975).
140
See 122 CONG. REC. 14,711 (1976) (quoting Congressman Peter W. Rodino’s
assumption that “if this bill’s premerger notification and waiting requirements are
enacted into law, the Government will have a fair and realistic chance to challenge
illegal mergers before they occur”); 122 CONG. REC. 15,310 et seq. (“[W]hat is even
more troublesome, the Department may not investigate mergers under the Antitrust
Civil Process Act until after the transaction has taken place. After an illegal merger
has taken place, securing adequate relief is extremely difficult. Once the eggs of the
two companies have been scrambled, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to pull
them apart.”).
141
Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 892.
142
Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 216.
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of the thousands that take place every year.”143 This assumption was
challenged by the Act’s opponents, who argued that “Title V’s premerger
notification provisions are unjustifiably broad, reaching too many transactions
and delaying them too long.”144 Hindsight reveals that thousands of mergers
and acquisitions annually fall within the ambit of the HSR Act’s premerger
notification requirements, although the vast majority are quickly and
expeditiously cleared.145
b. Opponents’ Assumptions Against the Bill
A primary assumption of the HSR Act’s opponents was that the legislation
and attendant rules would reach too many inconsequential transactions and
impose unnecessary costs, burdens, and delays on business. One commentator
opined in 1979, shortly after the final accompanying rules were promulgated,
that “regulation writers descended upon the scene, like a swarm of locusts.”146
Opponents branded the Bill’s requirements as “unrealistic,” and argued that it
“cover[ed] far more than ‘giant companies.’”147
A second major assumption was that the Act’s requirements would
“inhibit[] the competitive, efficient formation and allocation of capital
resources.”148 Senator Buckley contended that his constituents in the
investment community in New York feared “that the implications of this
legislation of Title V [would] be to dramatically curtail the ability of people to
move from one investment to another and all that this has meant down through
the years to permit our system of capital formation and mobility of capital to
perform its wonders.”149 The correctness of this assumption is called into
serious question by the tens of thousands of acquisitions and mergers that have
proceeded without challenge since the Act’s passage in 1976. For example, in
2002, the FTC challenged only 24 transactions, and the Antitrust Division only
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H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 11, (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637,

2643.
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Senate Minority Report, supra note 99, at 210.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N AND ANTITRUST DIV., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002: PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (J) OF SECTION 7A OF
THE CLAYTON ACT—HSR ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976 (TWENTY-FIFTH
REPORT)
1
(2002),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/25th-report-fy2002/hsrannualreport_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4NT-MYX8] [hereinafter ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR, 2002]; see also Richard W. Pogue, Effects
on Other Merger Transactions: Does the Government Abuse its Newly Granted
Power?, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1471, 1473–75 (1979).
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Pogue, supra note 145, at 1471.
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10. Moreover, a number of the challenged transactions were allowed to
proceed following limited divestitures of assets by the merging parties.150
4. The Clash of Values in the HSR Debates
In debating whether the public would be better served by the HSR Act’s
premerger notification requirements, each side sought to invoke cherished
American values. For example, the Act’s proponents invoked such values as
equal opportunity through increased competition, equality before the law,
diversity (less concentration increases dynamic efficiencies and innovation),
fairness, and accumulation of wealth deservedly through “hard-nosed
competition” rather than “gobbling up competitors.”
Opponents of premerger notification countered by invoking the values of
freedom of the marketplace, due process, efficiency (“bigger is better”), and
competition through neo-Darwinian philosophies of “survival of the fittest.”
As seen, these are essentially the same values that were argued and debated
prior to the passage of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Set forth below
is a comparison of the conflicting economic, moral, social, and political values
invoked by the proponents and opponents of the HSR Act.
Value Type
Economic

Proponents
Competitive
Relations
Diversity (small is
better)

Opponents
Collaborative Relations
Efficiency (big is better)

Moral/Cultural

Interdependence
Fairness

Independence
Freedom/“Survival of the
Fittest”

Social

Equality before the
law
Equal Opportunity
Anticipation of
crisis Corporate
responsibility to
society

Due Process
Freedom of Contract

Political

150

at 1–2.

Responsive to crisis
Protection of private
property

See ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR, 2002, supra note 145,
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Ultimately, the HSR legislative debates continued to pit fundamental
American values like protecting economic diversity, opportunity, and fairness
against such countervailing values as economic freedom, private property
rights, and efficiency through concentration. Throughout the HSR Act’s
legislative process, Congress sought to balance and blend the proponents’ and
opponents’ conflicting social, political, moral, and economic values to forge a
workable set of legislative compromises. Although the HSR Act’s proponents
urged Congress to accept and adopt the neoconservative economic values
being espoused in 1976 by Robert Bork and other Chicago School
neoconservatives, Congress declined to do so. Congress instead chose to enact
antitrust legislation designed to encourage and enhance America’s economic
strength through aggressive governmental oversight of mergers and
acquisitions and rigorous enforcement of the Clayton Act. Although some
neoconservative commentators have branded the HSR Act as “in many ways .
. . the last gasp of the old antitrust,”151 the HSR Act has served the test of time,
and is an invaluable asset in America’s ongoing antitrust merger and
acquisition enforcement.
C. American Values and the National Cooperative Production Amendments
of 1993 and 2004 to the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
In 1993, after four years of spirited Congressional hearings and debates,
President Clinton signed the National Cooperative Production Amendments of
1993,152 thereby creating the NCRPA.153 Congress originally passed the
NCRA in 1984 to “help ensure that fear of antitrust liability would not unduly
discourage firms from forming R&D [research and development] joint
ventures.”154 The 1993 Amendments expanded the NCRA to include
production joint ventures, and the 2004 Amendments further expanded the
NCRPA to include standards-setting organizations.155 “With respect to
production and research joint ventures, the NCRPA provides that such a ‘joint
venture’ will not be illegal per se, but will ‘be judged on the basis of its
reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting
competition.’”156 In passing the NCRPA, President Clinton worked closely
151

See, e.g., Sims & Herman, supra note 110, at 876.
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, §
3(b), (c), 107 Stat. 117, 118 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2012)).
153
15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306.
154
ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 78, at 468.
155
See id. at 469; 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (applying rule of reason to joint ventures and
standard-setting organizations). Congress set forth the purposes of its 1993 NCRA
Amendments as helping “to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and strengthen the
competitiveness of the United States in world markets . . . .” 107 Stat. at 119.
156
ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 78, at 469 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 4302). Congress later amended the NCRPA again in 2004 to cover voluntary
152
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with moderate Democrats and Republicans in Congress, as well as domestic
business interests, to create a “real bipartisan coalition to make America work
again, to help our business and our working people to move forward in the
global economy.”157
1. Legislative History of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress sought to address potential concerns and perceptions
that the prospect of antitrust challenges was partially responsible for the
reluctance of competitive firms in the United States to undertake joint research
and development (R&D) activities.158 The Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust, the Honorable J. Paul McGrath, testified in hearings before the
Senate that:
The antitrust problem in the area of joint R&D is this
perception—I should say misperception—that the antitrust
laws constitute a barrier to joint R&D. The perception
translates into a business risk—the risk that after substantial
investments are made in joint R&D, the venture participants
may be threatened by unfounded antitrust challenges . . . .159
Congress sought to allay such concerns through the NCRA, which
expressly allowed competitors to engage in approved joint R&D activities
without having to fear the prospect of potential treble antitrust damages. 160
Congress concluded that such legislation was necessary to stimulate “the

standards development organizations, as well as research and production joint
ventures. See Development and Promulgation of Voluntary Consensus Standards,
Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4305).
157
Remarks of President Clinton on signing the National Cooperative Production
Amendments of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC., NO. 23, 1059 (June 10, 1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Presidential Remarks].
158
S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 2–3 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105,
3107.
159
Id. at 3, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3107. Business executives
echoed such testimony. For example, Steven Olson, Associate General Counsel of
Control Data Corporation, testified in part that: “I think it fair to say that even among
those who believe that our antitrust laws do not—or at least under reasonable
application should not—inhibit cooperation in R&D, there is general agreement that
many business executives perceive such laws as significant barriers to joint research.
They thus shy away from such activities—and, over the long haul, our country is the
loser.” Id.
160
See 15 U.S.C. § 4303.
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international competitiveness of U.S. firms in both mature and emerging
industries.”161
Opponents of the 1984 NCRA legislation as originally proposed, tried, but
were unable to delete key provisions awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing
defendants in antitrust suits challenging joint R&D activities, and eliminating
a “94-year tradition of treble damages for proven violations of the antitrust
laws.”162 Criticizing President Reagan’s overall dramatic rollback of antitrust
161

S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 1, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3105. The
Report submitted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, then headed by Senator Strom
Thurmond (R-S.C.) explained:
The international competitiveness of U.S. firms in both mature
and emerging industries depends on their ability to remain at the
frontiers of technological development. Equally important, the
security of the United States vitally depends on the ability of U.S.
firms to maintain their technological edge.
Research and
development is critical to the success of those efforts.
In many industries, however, the research and development
necessary to remain competitive has become increasingly costly and
risky—indeed, often prohibitively so. In addition, limits on the
available pool of skilled scientific and technical personnel may
preclude any single company from gathering the talent needed to
make an R&D project successful.
In recent years, many of our trading partners have recognized the
need for collaborative R&D efforts. Having seen the potential for
tremendous economies that could be achieved through such efforts,
firms in other countries have formed numerous joint R&D projects,
often with government encouragement.
Many U.S. firms have also recognized the potential value of joint
R&D efforts. These firms recognize that joint R&D holds the
promise of a more efficient use of both scarce R&D capital and
human resources. In light of the increasing competitiveness of the
world economy, joint R&D efforts also represent a necessary step to
continued prominence of U.S. firms. Furthermore, stepped-up joint
R&D activity, and the innovation that it will make possible,
promises to increase productivity and employment, and to permit
continued American leadership in important fields of research.
Id. at 1–2, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105, 3105–06.
162
See id. at 32 as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3126 (statement of Senator
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)). Interestingly, Senator Metzenbaum mistakenly tied
treble damages to the Sherman Act of 1890, when in fact they were created by the
Clayton Act of 1914 (thereby creating only a 70-year tradition of treble damages for
proven violations of the antitrust laws).
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enforcement, Senator Metzenbaum, the former chair of the Judiciary
Committee, argued:
The current administration’s lax enforcement of the antitrust
laws demonstrate[d] that now, more than ever, we need
private antitrust enforcement. By eliminating the treble
damages incentive in difficult antitrust litigation, we may be
effectively immunizing such conduct. The elimination of
treble damages will have a very adverse effect on the ability
of those injured by violations committed by joint ventures—
typically small businesses—to vindicate their claim.163
Senator Metzenbaum and others also questioned the need for the NCRA,
since “the principal administration official who pushed this legislation, former
Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter, has publicly conceded that ‘the
extent to which the antitrust laws interfere with research and development is
vastly overrated.’”164
Through its passage of the NCRA in 1984, Congress showed that it
understood and was not afraid to exercise its power to limit the potential
breadth of its original antitrust laws. Importantly, however, Congress did so
without adopting wholesale the neoconservative economic values currently in
vogue. Instead, as with the HSR Act of 1976, Congress sought to carefully
balance and blend conflicting fundamental political, social, and economic
issues in an attempt to create a limited and workable legislative compromise
that would promote general American welfare.
2. The Legislative History of the 1993 NCRPA
President Clinton enthusiastically signed the 1993 National Cooperative
Production Amendments on June 10, 1993 in a White House ceremony, where
he praised the “real bipartisan coalition” that “worked so hard to make this bill
a reality and the leadership of both the House and the Senate.”165 Three weeks
earlier, on May 18, 1993, the House Judiciary Committee published an
extensive report praising the bill as “economically beneficial and conducive to
a resurgence of U.S. leadership in high technology.”166 Congress set out three
basic findings:
(a) technological innovation and its profitable
commercialization are critical components of the ability of the
163
164
165
166

189.

Id. at 34, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3128.
Id. at 33, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3128.
1993 Presidential Remarks, supra note 157, at 1058–59.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-94, at 16 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 176,
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United States to raise the living standards of Americans and
to compete in world markets;
(b) cooperative arrangements among nonaffiliated businesses
in the private sector are often essential for successful
technological innovation; and
(c) the antitrust laws may have been mistakenly perceived to
inhibit procompetitive cooperative innovation arrangements,
and so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to
promote such arrangements.167
Congress sought to justify the new amendments by painting a dire picture
of America’s declining competitiveness in the global marketplace.168
The House Judiciary Committee also extensively focused on increasing
criticism from Chicago School economists and business interests singling out
America’s antitrust laws “as a deterrent to innovative activity.”169 The
Committee cast an envious eye upon how “in Europe, and most particularly in
Japan, the formation of so-called ‘depression’ and ‘rationalization’ cartels has
become an important aspect of industrial policy.”170 Nevertheless, to ease the
167
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42,
107 Stat. 117, 117 (1993).
168
H.R. REP. NO. 103-94, at 8, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 180. The
House Judiciary Committee worryingly observed:

At the beginning of the 101st Congress, a number of developments
in several vital high-technology industries brought to the fore the
issue of the antitrust treatment of production joint ventures. The last
decade had witnessed a number of problems in economic and
educational performance that all seemed to point to a condition of
flagging U.S. international competitiveness: there was documented
evidence of the continued dismal educational performance in math
and science by American school children, a massive erosion of
domestic market share in industries ranging from telephones and
semiconductors to televisions and ball bearings, a serious
deterioration in the high-technology trade balance, and a decreasing
importance of American inventions in the patent system.
Id.
169

Id. at 9, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 181.
Id. at 9–10, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182. The House Judiciary
Committee emphasized:
170

The fundamental question presented by production joint venture
legislation has ultimately to do with the relationship between the
antitrust laws and innovation. The Committee is sympathetic to the
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concerns of the legislation’s diverse critics, the Committee stressed its
substantial desire and objective to not override the thrust of the antitrust laws
in blocking collusive and anticompetitive agreements between competitors.171
President Clinton’s upbeat and optimistic remarks on June 10, 1993, as he
signed the National Cooperative Production Amendments into law, presented
a “non-controversial façade” that masked spirited legislative hearings and
debates that had delayed the legislation’s passage for four years.172 President
Clinton exuberantly proclaimed that “by clarifying and eliminating
misapprehensions about antitrust risk, this legislation will allow joint ventures
that can increase efficiency, facilitate entry into markets, and create new
productive capacity that otherwise would simply not be achieved.”173 Yet, in
reality, the Amendments’ opponents succeeded in substantially watering down
the bill—thereby continuing some of the legal uncertainty surrounding
production joint ventures.174
Moreover, congressional recognition of
nationalistic and xenophobic concerns seriously limited the ability of domestic
desire to enhance collaborative activity in order to spur American
competitiveness, but not at the expense of those provisions of the
antitrust laws that are in place to ensure that smaller economic
players have the ability to redress antitrust injury resulting from the
exploitation of market power advantage.
In some quarters, a new theory appears to be developing which
holds that cooperation between firms engaged in industries subject
to rapid technological change cannot possibly injure competition,
because of the diversity of sources of innovation and the new nature
of global competition. Yet, at this point in time, that theory—though
obviously the product of thoughtful analysis—nevertheless remains
an economic hypothesis, and not a statement of empirically
demonstrated fact.
Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 189.
171
See id. (“Consequently, H.R. 1313, as the NCRA before it, seeks to clarify this
favorable view of cooperative ventures without making unwarranted substantive
changes in the fabric of the antitrust laws.”).
172
See ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 181 (1973).
173
1993 Presidential Remarks, supra note 157, at 1058.
174
As an example, Congress stated that the Amendment “create[s] no exemption
to the antitrust laws; nor does it change existing legal standards . . . . Nor does
compliance with the reporting procedures relieve any person of the notification
obligations under Hart-Scott-Rodino, 15 U.S.C. 18a.” H.R. REP NO. 103-94 at 5, as
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 177. Critics like Drake McKenney, an international
antitrust lawyer, concluded that “[u]nfortunately the definition of ‘joint venture,’ when
read in conjunction with the list of activities that are excluded from the definition of
joint venture pursuant to the new law, is far from a model of clarity.” See Drake D.
McKenney, New Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J.,
46, 47, 49 n.2. (Sept./Oct. 1994).

218

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 2

companies to take advantage of the Act by partnering with foreign
corporations.175 In effect, Congress’s and President Clinton’s desire to create
a broad bipartisan consensus “allow[ed] [the] legislators to avoid confronting
difficult questions.”176
As background, following the NCRA’s passage in 1984, its proponents
were greatly disappointed by how few American companies seemed to be
taking advantage of its provisions. For example, in 1989, Congressman Tom
Campbell (R-Ca) reported that “[w]hereas we have had roughly 30 filings a
year under the National Cooperative Research Act, Europe under their block
exemption from antitrust for the cooperative activity is running at over 300 per
year.”177 As anxiety increased over America’s perceived drop in global
economic competitiveness, Chicago School economic theorists and business
interests began pushing to greatly expand NCRA.178
Beginning in 1989, in the 101st Congress, a series of proposed legislation
was introduced seeking to expand domestic joint venture opportunities.
Different approaches included: 1) “extend[ing] existing procedures and
protections of the NCRA to cooperative activity beyond the research and
development stage” (House Bill 1025; House Bill 2264; House Bill 423);179 2)
taking a “certification” approach that “would have established a substantive
antitrust safe harbor when the parties to a joint venture lack market power in
the relevant product market” (House Bill 1024); and 3) “a project-specific bill
(House Bill 2287) . . . that would have established under the direction of the
Secretary of Commerce, an industry-led consortium for research and
production of high definition television systems.”180

175

See Derek Devgun, Crossborder Joint Ventures: A Survey of International
Antitrust Considerations, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 681, 713 (1996). Reviewing
Section 4306, Mr. Devgun observed “that Congress intended the 1993 amendments to
inure to the benefit of the U.S. economy, regardless of the nationalities of the parties
to the venture.” Id.
176
STEVEN M. GILLON, THAT’S NOT WHAT WE MEANT TO DO: REFORM AND ITS
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 238 (2000).
177
Production Joint Ventures Antitrust Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 423, H.R.
1024, H.R. 1025, and H.R. 2264 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and Commercial Law
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 51 (1989) [hereinafter House
Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Hon. Tom Campbell (R-Cal.)).
178
In opening the hearings on May 17, 1989, Chairman Jack Brooks observed that
“[t]he media has given recent coverage to the concern that America is losing the allimportant technological race in the areas of high definition television, supercomputers,
and superconductivity. Industry and Government spokesmen now urge that American
companies be allowed to form consortia to better compete.” Id. at 1.
179
H.R. REP. NO. 103-94, at 6, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 178. H.R.
423 “would have limited the NCRA protections only to small companies (less than
500 employees).” Id.
180
Id. at 6.

2018

REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES

219

Extensive hearings and debates ensued, and over the next four years, the
legislation slowly evolved into its ultimate form through protracted
subcommittee proceedings that included substantial mark-ups and introduction
of new bills. Throughout this arduous legislative process, Congress expressed
concerns over the White House’s perceived lack of interest and involvement.
For example, on July 26, 1989, Chairman Brooks admonished Secretary of
Commerce Robert A. Mosbacher:
[W]e’re still waiting. When do you think the proposal
will be submitted to us?
....
You can understand, before we reach a decision in the
Committee, we would like to have some indication really of
where you’re coming from on this issue . . . . We may not
agree with you fully but we will have an idea of where we can
go.
Nobody wants to dig into one of these issues when we
don’t have some basis of accord with the White House. This
kind of issue is so important.181
President Clinton’s and Vice President Gore’s personal and substantial
involvement in support of the legislation in early 1993 ultimately turned the
tide in the proponents’ favor.182 However, the lengthy congressional
proceedings, which spanned three separate Congresses (the 101st through the
103rd), galvanized the opponents, and enabled them to firmly stamp their
imprints upon the final bill.183 Thus, Arthur Kaplan, a plaintiff’s antitrust
181

House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 157 (statement of Hon. Jack
Brooks).
182
See THE CRISIS AND RENEWAL OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: A CIVILIZATIONAL
APPROACH TO MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 186 (Laurence CossuBeaumont et al. eds. 2016) (discussing President Clinton’s efforts to build a more
coherent, competitive competition policy through such means as increased R&D joint
ventures and collaborations).
183
See
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/advancedsearch/legislation?congresses%5B%5D=103&congresses%5B%5D=102&congresse
s%5B%5D=101&legislationNumbers=&restrictionType=field&restrictionFields%5
B%5D=allBillTitles&restrictionFields%5B%5D=summary&summaryField=billSum
mary&enterTerms=“national+cooperative+production”&wordVariants=true&legislat
ionTypes%5B%5D=hr&legislationTypes%5B%5D=hres&legislationTypes%5B%5
D=hjres&legislationTypes%5B%5D=hconres&legislationTypes%5B%5D=hamdt&l
egislationTypes%5B%5D=s&legislationTypes%5B%5D=sres&legislationTypes%5
B%5D=sjres&legislationTypes%5B%5D=sconres&legislationTypes%5B%5D=sam
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attorney from Philadelphia, who testified aggressively against the Bill on
September 28, 1989, was able to testify on March 18, 1993, in support of the
ultimate Bill.184 Kaplan was pleased that the Bill was “explicitly limited to
joint production facilities in the United States, generating jobs here in the
United States,” and felt the final Bill struck “a reasonable balance and
correct[ed] misperceptions about the antitrust laws.”185 Chairman Brooks
similarly noted on March 18, 1993, that the ultimate Bill “represent[ed] a
significant improvement over those measures previously introduced in this
Committee,” and lauded such a “bipartisan agreement.”186 He added, “it
reflects not only today’s economic realities but also a determination, on both
sides of the aisle, to take effective steps to meet that challenge.”187
During the Presidency of George W. Bush, Congress further expanded the
scope of the NCRPA in 2004 to extend to “standards development
organization[s] while engaged in a standards development activity.” 188
Congress noted that:
Standard development organizations play a pivotal role in
promoting free market competition. Technical standards
promote product competition by ensuring a common interface
between products that may be substituted for one another.189
Congress was impressed in part by the arguments of economist David
Teece that “[c]ompatibility standards are essential if products and their

dt&legislationTypes%5B%5D=suamdt&public=true&private=true&chamber=all&ac
tionTerms=&legislativeActionWordVariants=true&dateOfActionOperator=equal&d
ateOfActionStartDate=&dateOfActionEndDate=&dateOfActionIsOptions=yesterday
&legislativeAction=Any&sponsorState=One&member=&sponsorTypes%5B%5D=s
ponsor&sponsorTypes%5B%5D=sponsor&sponsorTypeBool=OR&committeeBoolT
ype=OR&satellite=%5B%5D&search=search&searchResultViewType=expanded
[https://perma.cc/PWE7-8GFG] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (outlining the discussions
of the NCRA throughout the 101st-103rd Congresses).
184
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 424 (statement of Arthur
Kaplan); National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993: Hearing on H.R.
1313 Before the Subcomm. On Econ. and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 45 (1993) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearings II]
(statement of Arthur Kaplan).
185
House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 43, 44–45 (statement of
Arthur Kaplan).
186
Id. at 17–18 (statement of Hon. Jack Brooks).
187
Id.
188
See 15 U.S.C. § 4302(2); 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(7).
189
H.R. REP. NO. 108-125, at 3 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 642,
643.
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complements are to be used in a system.”190 As with the NCRPA of 1993, the
2004 Amendments expressly excluded such activities as “[e]xchanging
information among competitors relating to cost, sales, profitability, prices,
marketing, or distribution of any product, process, or service that is not
reasonably required for the purpose of developing or promulgating a voluntary
consensus standard . . . .”191
3. The Political, Economic, and Ideological Context of the NCRPA
Political, economic, technical, and ideological factors all played critical
roles between 1989 and 1993, in shaping and influencing the scope of the
NCRPA as enacted in June, 1993, and subsequently amended in 2004.
a. Political Factors
Neither President H.W. Bush nor his Administration ever got behind the
proposals to amend the NCRA in any meaningful way. A possible explanation
may be that the Administration was concerned about opposition to the
legislation by entrepreneurs such as Dr. T.J. Rodgers, the President and CEO
of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation in San Jose, California, and George
Gilder, a conservative Republican author.192 Another possibility is that the
Administration was unable or unwilling to choose sides among the numerous
competing interest groups.
In any event, once President Clinton came to power, the efforts to amend
the NCRA took off. President Clinton’s support was largely due to his desire
in early 1993 to be perceived as a friend to business while he got the sluggish
economy moving.193 President Clinton saw the legislation as:

190
Id. at 3 (citing David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation and Antitrust,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 475 (1994)).
191
15 U.S.C. § 4301(c)(1)–(3); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-125, at 9, as reprinted
in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 649–50.
192
Interestingly, James F. Rill, who served as the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust under Bush I, never testified concerning the legislation during his tenure at
Justice. However, in March 1993, shortly after President Clinton assumed office, Mr.
Rill was invited to appear as a featured speaker in favor of the legislation. See House
Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 23–33 (statement of James Rill). Mr.
Rill testified that “of the various approaches that have been suggested in this area, a
straightforward extension of the NCRA to joint production ventures is the best option.”
Id. at 29.
193
The Clinton campaign’s focus on the economy was made popular by campaign
advisor James Carville’s infamous phrase “It’s the economy, stupid!” THE WAR
ROOM (Cyclone Films et al., 1993). The phrase is memorialized in the notorious
documentary The War Room, which followed the campaign in the New Hampshire
primaries. Id.
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[T]he embodiment of the concept that the Vice President
and I strongly espoused during our campaign last year. It will
allow American companies, large and small, to pool their
resources to compete and win in the international
marketplace.
....
This is an example of how you can have a real bipartisan
coalition to make America work again, to help our business
and our working people to move forward in the global
economy.194
Perhaps even more importantly, President Clinton was looking forward to
recommending a dramatic series of health care reforms. A key component of
such reforms was expected to include “[t]he formation of large regional
alliances which would buy health care insurance for individuals and small
businesses. . . . [And] at the same time, . . . encourage greater cooperation
among health care providers.”195 Thus, President Clinton saw his visible and
successful support for the National Cooperative Production Amendments as a
crucial first step in priming the pump for future antitrust reforms related to
health care.
In early 1993, with the American economy sagging, and a new President
in office largely as a result of economic frustrations, Congress felt tremendous
pressure to be perceived as aggressively supporting technological innovation
and American competitiveness. As Chairman Brooks noted in his opening
statement on March 18, 1993, “[a]fter two Congresses of contemplating
possible legislation in this area, I think it is high time we act on this bill if we
are going to do our part in bolstering American competitiveness.”196 Praising
the bipartisan nature of the legislation, Chairman Brooks expressed his
agreement with President Clinton’s view of the legislation as “just the kind of
forward-thinking initiative we need to drive the economy toward a decade of
creative change.”197
b. Economic Factors
Similar to the passage of the HSR Act, changing macroeconomic factors
194

1993 Presidential Remarks, supra note 157, at 1058–59.
Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New
Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 875 (1994)
(footnotes omitted).
196
House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 1 (statement of Hon. Jack
Brooks).
197
Id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Jack Brooks) (quoting President Bill Clinton).
195
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were crucial to setting the context for the debates over the National
Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993. These included the ongoing
transition from a domestic to an increasingly globalized economy, and the
continued development of neoconservative Chicago School economic
theories. Economists such as Milton Friedman were finding receptive
audiences for their criticisms of “[t]he over-estimation of the importance of
monopoly”198 and their recommendations that government “let [people] follow
the bent of their own interests because there is no way of predicting where they
will come out.”199
Contemporaneous with Congress’s consideration of the legislation, the
media were focusing upon the developing economic thinking that effective
global competition requires access to substantial amounts or resources
procured through cooperative efforts. For example, on February 17, 1993, the
New York Times praised a joint venture between Cummins Engine Company
and Komatsu Limited of Japan, as another in the growing “list of huge
multinationals pooling their resources to manufacture existing products and
develop new ones.”200 Similarly, on April 13, 1993, the Wall Street Journal
reported approvingly on a series of ten collaborative research and development
activities between the “Big Three” American automakers.201 Also receiving
substantial media attention, as the legislation moved towards final passage,
was a series of global telecommunications and network alliances.202 Picking
up on such media reports, Representative Carlos J. Moorhead submitted a
formal statement advocating joint venture legislation that would result in
“more efficient use of capital, the development of new products for the
American consumer, and the creation of new jobs for American workers.”203
Also critically important to the passage of the Amendments was the
economic perception in early 1993 that the Japanese and Europeans were
gaining ground, and even beating America in the new global economy.
Representative of such thinking was the testimony in March 1993 of Pat
198

See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 123 (rev. ed., 2002).
Id. at 118.
200
Barnaby J. Feder, Two Diesel Giants Set Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993,
at D1. The article added that the diesel engine production joint venture “comes at a
time when the pace of industrial cooperation is accelerating both domestically and
across borders.” Id. at D5.
201
Oscar Survis, Big Three Win Joint Patent, Making a First, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 1993, at B1.
202
Mary Lu Carnevale et al., U.S. West Move Puts Pressure on Its Rivals, WALL
ST. J., May 18, 1993, at B1; AT&T Plans to Establish Global Information System,
WALL ST. J., May 26, 1993, at B6; John J. Keller & Mary Lu Carnevale, MCI and BT
Set a Counterstrike Against AT&T, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at A3; Stephen K. Yoder
& G. Pascal Zachary, Digital Media Business Takes Form as a Battle of Complex
Alliances, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1993, at A1.
203
House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 19 (statement of Hon.
Carlos J. Moorhead).
199
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Choate, an economist and former vice president for policy analysis at TRW,
and a director of the Manufacturing Policy Project.204 Additional economic
concerns included America’s growing trade deficits, and the loss of
manufacturing jobs as the domestic manufacturing base shifted from
“smokestack” to hi-tech industries.205
c. Ideological Factors
As Milton Friedman observed, “[i]n the economic area, a major problem
arises in respect of the conflict between freedom to combine and freedom to
compete.”206 By the late 1980s, the American courts and regulatory agencies

204

Mr. Choate argued:
When one takes a look at American industry and the global
economy, we have to find the ways and means to make American
industry swift and strong.
Now, one of the reasons that the country’s industries have not
been able to compete is they lack some of the options that other
industries in other countries have to work together. I think H.R.
1313 cuts out some underbrush that is hampering American industry
today.
The second thing that is very clear is that American industry
today is facing competition that is organized in a very different way
in Europe and in Japan and Korea than in the United States. These
industries operate, as this committee has studied before, in giant
keiretsus that have banks that stand in the center, and these banks
are backed by their governments. They literally cannot go bankrupt.
These are competitors who cannot go bankrupt.
....
Now, I am an economist and not a lawyer, but reading H.R. 1313
through an economist’s eyes, I think it does some things that need
to be done in this economy. It permits our companies to come and
work together. It allows them to do it with greater assurances of no
frivolous lawsuits, primarily private lawsuits.

Id. at 39. In his written comments, Mr. Choate pessimistically added that “global
competition for American entrepreneurs and firms is a bet your company gamble. And
we are losing.” Id. at 41.
205
See, e.g., House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 163 (statement of
Chairman Jack Brooks “that the trade is moving steadily to the Eastern rim.”)
206
FRIEDMAN, supra note 198, at 26.
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had dramatically shifted from favoring the freedom to compete207 over the
freedom to combine, to favoring more competitor combinations and
collaborations under the guise of increasing allocative efficiencies.208
Equally important from the legislation’s opponents’ perspective was the
countervailing economic idea that “free and open competition” was the key to
long-term American economic competitiveness.209 San Francisco plaintiffs’
antitrust attorney (and former San Francisco mayor) Joe Alioto argued,
“there’s absolutely no question that something like 8 to 9 out of 10 of the new
products are developed by smaller companies and that 8 out of 10 of the jobs
are created by smaller companies.”210 Mr. Alioto concluded that “[e]veryone
should have the right to compete and all of our markets should be free, open
and unfettered. There should be no fixes.”211
Throughout the legislative debates, ideologies and viewpoints relating to
the economic impacts of global technological competition were fiercely
debated. For example, Representative Boucher (R-Va) observed that
207

For example, in 1984, economists David Teese and Thomas Jorde criticized the
earlier prevailing view that “no cooperation should be permitted, that it is best we keep
companies apart from one another.” Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teese, Innovation,
Cooperation, and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 12, 18 n.43 (1989). Professor Jorde,
from University of California, Berkeley, testified in favor of the National Cooperative
Production Amendments on July 26, 1989. House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note
177, at 221 (statement of Professor Thomas Jorde). Professor Jorde noted that “[t]he
need for business cooperation and the drag the current antitrust law places upon that
cooperation is a subject that I have been studying now for a number of years with my
colleague, David Teese, of the University of California.” Id. at 222.
208
See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
Judge Easterbrook wrote:
Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people
to cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others,
and cooperation facilitates efficient production . . . . The war of all
against all is not a good model for any economy. Antitrust law is
designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and
competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at
every
moment.
Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
209
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 203, 219 (statement of Dr.
T.J. Rodgers of Cypress Semiconductor Corp.). Dr. Rodgers argued, “I don’t think
we have to give up the American entrepreneurial system to Japanese-like controls in
the United States. I think the solution is education. Give us more engineers. We’ll
go off and fight with the Japanese.” Id.
210
Id. at 260.
211
Id. at 258. Mr. Alioto added that “the antitrust laws are our Magna Carta of
free enterprise . . . They are as important to our economic freedom as the Bill of Rights
is to our personal freedom.” Id. at 256.
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“technically oriented industries are characterized today by increasingly short
product life cycles, by continuous modification of products as experience
suggests new areas for improvements, and rapid response to consumer demand
both for variety and customization . . . .”212 Contemporary media reports
similarly focused on the purported success of competitive alliances in
developing new technologies and cutting-edge innovations.213 The need for
accumulated capital to conduct expensive R&D and bring innovations to
market successfully also was paramount.214
4. The Underlying Values and Ideological Premises of the Proponents and
Opponents of the NCRPA
a. Proponents’ Assumptions for the Bill
A major assumption driving the Bill’s proponents was that the Japanese
and the Europeans were winning the long-term economic battle for control of
the globalized marketplace due to their government-sanctioned cooperative
efforts. By 1993, Japan was being referred to as “Japan, Inc.,” and authors like
Michael Crichton were writing sinister novels about Japan’s economic
conquest of the western world.215 In the words of Pat Choate, “we are
losing.”216 Ironically, as Japan’s economy crashed in the mid-1990s, the
Japanese began questioning the effectiveness of their Keiretsus (business

212

House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 48 (statement of Rep.
Boucher).
213
See, e.g., Stephen E. Almassy & E.B. Baatz, 455 Electronics Execs Say Rugged
Individualism is Fading, reprinted in ERNST & YOUNG, PROGRESSION OF AN
INDUSTRY: ELECTRONICS 92: STRATEGIC ALLIANCE OUTLOOK (1992).
214
See, e.g., House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 55. Representative
Tom Campbell (R-Ca.) noted:
Many of the cutting-edge industries for international competition
require massive amounts of capital . . . . This high specific capital
cost takes many of these investments beyond the scope of single
American firms. The joint venture, or consortium, provides an
appealing alternative. Capital costs are shared; market risks are
diversified.
Id. at 55–56.
215
See generally MICHAEL CRICHTON, RISING SUN (1992) (unraveling a fictitious
murder-mystery whilst providing a skeptical commentary of Japanese-American
economic relations).
216
House Subcommittee Hearings II, supra note 184, at 41.

2018

REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES

227

networks) and ultimately implemented more comprehensive and tougher
competition laws.217
The second major assumption held by the proponents was that a fear of
antitrust liability had chilled the formation of efficient procompetitive
production joint ventures. Representative Thomas Campbell, who had
formerly served as the director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of
Competition, presented the specter of “per se treatment” in arguing that far
more production joint ventures would exist in a more hospitable legal
environment.218
As early as 1984, during the hearing on the NCRA, Senator Metzenbaum
and others had questioned such assumptions. They pointed to the paucity of
historical antitrust challenges to research joint ventures and the absence of
“hard evidence to support the claim that elimination of treble damages will
encourage significantly more joint ventures.”219 Representative Synar
observed that: “First, there are several examples of joint ventures already
formed, operating and successful under the antitrust laws. Second, the
Antitrust Division . . . has never challenged a joint venture with an allegation
of per se antitrust illegality. And third, it is difficult to believe that any
negative perception exists even under this [lax] Antitrust Division.”220 The
opponents’ criticisms appear to have been justified. Since 1993, relatively few
companies have chosen to avail themselves of the Act’s notification
provisions, and not a single legal case interpreting or applying the Act appears
today in Title 15 of the United States Code Annotated.221
b. Opponents’ Assumptions Against the Bill
A primary assumption of the legislation’s opponents was that the
durability of America’s antitrust laws has helped protect America’s long-term
economic prospects. George R. Heaton, an industrial economist at MIT, stated
in 1989, “[t]o me, the fact of 100 years [of American antitrust laws] suggest
A series of studies examining all of Japan’s government-sanctioned cartels
from 1953 to 1994 “found virtually no cartels in Japan’s highly successful industries,
while cartelized industries such as petrochemicals, chemical fertilizers, textiles and
cement were largely unsuccessful internationally.” Michael E. Porter & Mariko
Sakakibara, Competition in Japan, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS., 27, 40 (Winter 2004).
218
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 53.
219
S. REP. NO. 98-427, at 33 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105,
3127.
220
House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 43, 269 (statement of Rep.
Synar) (“Since [May], there has been nothing presented to change my mind.”); see
also id. at 393 (statement of Rep. Coelho) (“I don’t believe that an antitrust law change
will help facilitate what they’re trying to do.”).
221
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301–4306 (West 2009 & Supp. 2017) (citing no cases that
analyze the disclosure requirements).
217
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[sic] a differing starting assumption, and that is, conservatism. The durability
of antitrust law coupled with its relative resistance to change reflect, in my
view, a well-considered wisdom of the American people.”222
A second key assumption of the opponents was that “wide open
competitiveness,” rather than competitor collaborations, creates the best
chances for inventing new technologies. Dr. T.J. Rodgers of Cypress
Semiconductor Corporation pointed to the success of Intel in developing the
dynamic RAM, but then losing its “position as the American leader in that
market to Micron Technology, an entrepreneurial start-up in Boise, Idaho.
Intel also invented the static RAM, a faster memory used in high-performance
computers, only to abandon that market to Cypress, and our arch rival,
Integrated Device Technology.”223 Dr. Rodgers asserted that “[i]f the antitrust
laws had been relaxed a few years ago at the expense of these start-ups who
held their ground in the memory market, the Japanese would have been
virtually 100% successful in wiping out our semiconductor memory
industry.”224
Finally, the opponents assumed that the Bill’s attempts to discriminate in
favor of American companies would “hurt American competitiveness” by
depressing the level of foreign investment in the United States.225 This
assumption has been effectively rebutted by the continuing staggering level of
foreign investment in the United States, which helps support our escalating
budget deficits.226
5. Conflicting Values in the NCRPA Debates
In debating the merits of the National Cooperative Production
Amendments of 1993, both sides agreed upon the desired economic outcome:
enhanced American global competitiveness through greater scientific
advancements and technological innovations, and increased domestic
productivity. Yet they differed dramatically in the role Congress and
government regulation should play in helping to achieve such objectives. In
debating whether to allow increased cooperation and collaboration between
222

House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 177, at 88.
Id. at 198.
224
Id.
225
See Letter of Robert Umphrey, Chairman, Investment Committee, Organization
for International Investment (an association “of more than 50 U.S. companies
representing a broad cross-section of the manufacturing and services sections”) to
Hon. Jack Brooks (Mar. 17, 1993), reprinted in the Appendix to House Subcommittee
hearings II, supra note 184.
226
See generally MARC LABONTE AND JARED C. NAGEL, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF FEDERAL DEBT (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22331.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ2D-7GWM].
223
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competitive businesses, each side invoked their own set of cherished and
historical American values. A powerful tension existed between the
proponents’ belief in increased cooperation, collaboration, and efficiency, and
the opponents’ belief in competition and diversity. For example, the
proponents lauded the potential efficiency gains from increased cooperation
and collaboration, and the fairness to businesses of greater legal and regulatory
certainty. The opponents countered that open and unfettered competition
between a diverse group of entrepreneurial small businesses would allow the
economic cream to rise to the top, and spur innovation and technological
advances.
Set forth below is a comparison of the conflicting economic, moral, social,
and political values that drove the debates and the ultimate legislative
compromises.
Values Type

Proponents

Opponents

Economic

Collaborative/cooperative
relations
Efficiency

Competitive
relations
Diversity

Moral/Cultural

Interdependence
Nationalism
Freedom

Independence
Globalism
Fairness

Social

Due Process
Legal Certainty

Equality Before the
Law
Legal Responsibility

Political

Spontaneous Cooperation
Government Support of
Business (Government as a
Partner)
Anticipation of Crisis
Private Property is Owned
Absolutely

Regulated
Cooperation
Government
Regulation of
Business (neutral
government)
Responsive to Crisis
Societal Interest in
Business Resources

Similar to earlier legislative debates concerning American antitrust
legislation, core American political, social, and economic values had to be
balanced and blended to achieve working legislative majorities. The four years
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of hearings leading to the NCRPA mirrored the earlier debates over the 1976
HSR Act. The core American values of competition, diversity, and fairness
held by progressive thinkers such as Louis Brandeis, Teddy Roosevelt, and
Howard Metzenbaum ran headlong into the competing values of
concentration, collaboration, efficiency, and economic freedom held by freemarket conservatives such as Milton Friedman, Ronald Reagan, and Strom
Thurmond.
A unique confluence of political factors, including President Clinton’s
recent election based primarily upon widespread economic anxiety, enabled
the NCRPA’s opponents and proponents to craft a series of compromises that
generated widespread bipartisan support for the legislation. Bipartisan support
was further solidified by focusing upon the shared values of increased
American economic competitiveness through scientific advancement and
technological innovation, and the generally shared assumption that greater
protections from the antitrust laws would catalyze the formation of a myriad
of new production joint ventures.227 Perhaps most importantly, between 1984
and 2003, Congress never adopted wholesale neoconservatives’ economic
philosophies or values, and instead passed and amended legislation designed
to create carefully circumscribed and limited exceptions to aggressive
enforcement of the Sherman Act. As it had done in passing the HSR Act in
1976, Congress made it clear that it was not prepared to abandon or discount
the diverse political, social, and moral goals underlying our early antitrust
laws.
III. CONGRESS’S HISTORICAL BALANCING AND BLENDING OF DIVERSE
FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL, POLITICAL, MORAL, AND ECONOMIC
VALUES AND OBJECTIVES IN AMERICA’S ANTITRUST LAWS
The antitrust legislative histories and impressive scholarship discussed in
227

As discussed, President Clinton announced the 1993 NCRPA Amendments with
great fanfare, and Congress then passed the 2004 Amendments with little discussion
or opposition. This showed that following extensive legislative debates in 1984 and
1993, the legislation was no longer seen as controversial during the Bush II years.
Nevertheless, the initial extensive opposition and heated values debates ultimately
resulted in a substantial watering down of the proponents’ original objectives.
Ultimately, the ongoing debates and congressional review had the positive unintended
consequence of catalyzing the promulgation seven years later by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission of extensive, meaningful, and useful
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors. These Guidelines serve
today as a material source of legal guidance for competitive companies seeking to
enter into joint ventures. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE AND FTC ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES
FOR
COLLABORATION
AMONG
COMPETITORS
(2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venturehearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines2.pdf [https://perma.cc/N44F-XF25].
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Part II confirm that Congress has never sought to codify through our antitrust
laws a single economic philosophy or ideology such as Chicago
neoconservative economics.228 Neither has Congress sought to promote a
single neoconservative economic objective such as maximizing consumer
welfare or allocative efficiency.229 Rather, Congress has sought to balance
various communal and market values with the goal of promoting America’s
economic and political welfare while safeguarding and protecting cherished
historical American values including equality of opportunity, economic
diversity, divided economic and political power, and economic ethics,
morality, and fairness.230
For more than 100 years, Congress has approached antitrust with the
political understanding that it must balance and blend a diverse array of social,
political, moral, and economic objectives. In so doing, Congress has
recognized that the relevant social, political, moral, and economic concerns
underlying our antitrust laws are “more than menacing neighbors.”231 Rather,
they are “interdependent and mutually defining” sets of societal values and
visions that must be balanced and blended if our antitrust laws are to be
See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 63, at 26 (discussing how “the common-law
Sherman Act, with its supplement of uncommon-law remedies, seemed to be reaching
for a middle ground between the rhetorics of industrial liberty and fair price, between
their logics of competition policy and private property rights, and between their statist
and libertarian approaches.”); Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than
Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1191
(1977); HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 199–200 (discussing Congress’s economic,
social, and political goals); Stucke II, supra note 27, at 2578 (discussing how
competition policy “has had, and will always have, multiple, economic, political,
social, and moral objectives”).
229
Stucke I, supra note 1, at 599; see also THORELLI, supra note 26, at 165
(discussing how the Sherman Act sought to balance “the conflict between some of the
most ingrained ideas of the American people of the nature and workings of [our]
political economy”); Fox, supra note 13, at 578 (discussing Clayton Act’s diverse
economic goals); Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051-60 (discussing antitrust’s key
political goals); Horton IV, supra note 12, at 632–34 (discussing Congress’s concern
with protecting competitive opportunities); Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More
Than a Century After Sherman: Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition
More Than Economically-Efficient Mergers, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 230 (2009)
(“[P]rotecting competitors is one main purpose for which Congress enacted antitrust
legislation . . . .”).
230
See generally Daniel Yankelovich, How Changes in the Economy Are
Reshaping American Values, in VALUES IN PUBLIC POLICY 16, 23 (H. J. Aaron et al.
eds., 1994) (discussing the importance of such “unchanged values” as equality of
opportunity, fairness, and freedom); id. at 43 (discussing the “conflict Americans feel
between what might be called ‘market values’ versus ‘communal values’”); id. at 44
(arguing that even in harsh economic times, “Americans care deeply about reconciling
communal with market values”).
231
PERITZ, supra note 63, at 303.
228
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workable, effective, and supported by both the business community and the
American public.232
When Congress passed such core antitrust legislation as the Sherman Act
in 1890, and the Clayton and FTC Acts in 1914, it was fully cognizant of and
wished to push forward the broad social, political, moral, and economic
currents favoring equality of opportunity, fair and ethical competition, and the
fear of concentrated power—both political and economic. These core
American values predated the American Revolution, and sparked the Boston
Tea Party on December 16, 1773—a revolt against the British East India
Company’s efforts to monopolize the colonial tea trade.233
Such fundamental values and concerns continued to mold Americans’
thinking in the early years of our Republic.234 For example, on September 18,
1833, President Andrew Jackson stated that American citizens’ freedoms were
at risk “from combinations of the wealthy and professional classes,” whose
wealth was too often “insidiously employed.”235 President Abraham Lincoln
232

Id. Professor Peritz believes that the blending of such values through
congressional bargaining and negotiation represents our antitrust laws’ strength. He
explains:
Such treatment of economic and political affairs can open the
rhetorical space necessary for competition policy to promote public
deliberation, to sustain participatory government, while inspiring
individual aspirations and economic enterprise. For competition
policy to remain a durable good, it must reflect a dialogical sense of
political economy. It is in that sense of interdependence between
liberty and equality, between individual and collectivity, and,
finally, between “the market” and “the state,” that we find the
continuing possibility of democratic politics and economic
opportunity.
Id.
233

See TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE
DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 41–45 (2005). The Boston Tea Party was led and carried
out largely by Boston merchants, who were neither concerned about “consumer
welfare” nor “allocative efficiency.” Rather, they were protecting their rights to
compete equally on a fair playing field against the attempted “vertical integration”
sought by the British East India Company. Id. at 43; see also BENJAMIN WOODS
LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY 60–62 (1964).
234
See, e.g., NACE, supra note 233, at 46–55. Thomas Jefferson, for example,
expressed grave concerns in 1816 concerning the potential of “monied corporations”
challenging the strength of the federal government, and “bid[ding] defiance to the laws
of our country.” Id. at 46 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Logan (Nov.
1816), in PAUL LEICESTER FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, VOL. 10 69
(1892-1899)).
235
JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 267
(2008).

2018

REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES

233

expressed similar concerns about powerful aggregations of capital threatening
our democracy in a letter to businessman and friend William Elkins in
November 1864, while the Civil War was still raging.236 Henry Adams, the
grandson and great-grandson of two American Presidents, also expressed deep
fears in 1870, “that the day is at hand when corporations . . . after having
created a system of quiet but irresistible corruption—will ultimately succeed
in directing government itself.”237
Americans also historically were driven by sacred notions of equal
economic opportunity on a fair playing field.238 For example, in 1864, Lincoln
told a group of Ohio soldiers returning home from the Civil War that America
represented “an open field and a fair chance for your industry, enterprise, and
intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the race of life, with all
its desirable human aspirations.”239 President Lincoln’s speech typified a
growing American belief that true freedom and liberty could not exist in
“situation[s] of extreme economic inequality” and economic unfairness.240
Against these fundamental visions of American freedom, the early
antitrust Congresses had to balance the growing social, political, and economic
philosophies and ideologies of Social Darwinism and its attendant rhetoric of
“survival of the fittest,” laissez-faire economics, and the supposed efficiencies

236
NACE, supra note 233, at 14–15 (quoting Letters from Abraham Lincoln to Col.
William Elkins (Nov. 21, 1864)); see also EMANUEL HERTZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A
NEW PORTRAIT, VOL. II 954 (1931). A number of critics have questioned the
authenticity of the quoted letters, but no definitive proof backing this claim exists.
237
NACE, supra note 233, at 15 (alteration in original) (quoting The New York Gold
Conspiracy, WESTMINSTER REV. (1870)).
238
See, e.g., HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 10 (discussing how nineteenth
century American traditions of political revolt revolved around attacking monopolies
and “against limits upon the avenues of personal advancement”).
239
DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 653 (2005) (citing Abraham Lincoln, Speech to One Hundred
Sixty-Sixth Ohio Regiment (Aug. 22, 1864), in VII COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 512 (2001)).
240
See, e.g., SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE
DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 323–27 (1993); ERIC
FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 126–30 (1998); PERITZ, supra note 63, at
11 (“Progressives and some conservatives understood the proliferation of large-scale
commercial enterprise as a new form of commercial genius that exploded rough
equality and economic independence.”); W. SCOTT MORGAN, HISTORY OF THE WHEEL
AND ALLIANCE, AND THE IMPENDING REVOLUTION 15–17 (1889) (describing how
trusts were “demoralizing in [their] influence, inconsistent with free institutions and
dangerous to our liberties”); THORELLI, supra note 26, at 147 (quoting HAROLD V.
FAULKNER & MARK STARR, LABOR IN AMERICA 67 (1944)) (“Many, perhaps most,
workers [in 1890] felt a natural affinity with other economically less favored groups
who were trying ‘to bring back some equality of opportunity.’”).

234

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16, No. 2

of corporate and capital concentrations.241 In this neo-Darwinian world, “the
most ruthless and unfair business practices . . . seem[ed] to be justified” to
ensure the “survival of the fittest” and overall societal progress.242 As put by
historian Richard Hofstadter, “[w]ith its rapid expansion, its exploitative
methods, its desperate competition, and its peremptory rejection of failure,
post-bellum America was like a vast human caricature of the Darwinian
struggle for existence and survival of the fittest.”243 According to historians
Eric Foner and Richard Hofstadter, “social Darwinism served the needs of
those groups that controlled the ‘raw, aggressive, industrial society’ of the
Gilded Age. Spencer, Sumner, and the other Social Darwinists were telling
businessmen and political leaders what they wanted to hear.”244 Social
Darwinism in economics was supported by the growing ideologies of liberty
of contract, protection of private property, and laissez-faire non-interference
with economic relationships.245
241

See, e.g., FONER, supra note 240, at 119–23; HOFSTADTER III, supra note 24,
at 118–21 (“In a society of great collective aggregates, the traditional emphasis upon
the exploits of the individual lost much of its appeal. The old problem of defending
competition from critics on the left now paled as people were forced to face ‘the curse
of bigness,’ the more imminent threat to competition from the offspring of competition
itself.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV.
645, 645–50 (1985).
242
Richard McCarty, Business and Benevolence, in BUSINESS ETHICS: A
PHILOSOPHICAL READER 46–47 (Thomas I. White ed. 1993); see also Louis D.
Brandeis, Competition, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS 112, 115 (Osmund K. Fraenkel ed. 1935) (“[I]t is not competition to
resort to methods of the prize ring, and simply ‘knock the other man out.’ That is
killing a competitor.”); CASHMAN, supra note 240, at 61 (describing how Rockefellers
bought out his competitors “at knockdown prices” while Carnegie “simply squeezed
them out by cutthroat competition”).
243
HOFSTADTER III, supra note 31, at 44.
244
FONER, Introduction to HOFSTADTER III (Beacon Press ed., 1992), supra note
31, at xvi.
245
William Graham Sumner, perhaps Social Darwinism’s greatest proponent,
believed that government should exist only to protect private property, and “not to
upset social arrangements decreed by nature.” FONER, supra note 240, at 122; see also
JAMES W. BROCK, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 332 (13th ed. 2016)
[hereinafter BROCK I] (“The Darwinian criticism has long held that a laissez-faire
policy best promotes economic performance by nurturing natural selection among the
economically fittest firms.”); FONER, Introduction to HOFSTADTER III (Beacon Press
ed., 1992), supra note 31, at ix, xix (describing how the roots of legal thought
supporting Social Darwinism lay “in classical economics and a preoccupation with
defending property rights and limiting the power of the state”); William Graham
Sumner, The Concentration of Wealth: Its Economic Justification, in ON LIBERTY,
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS: THE ESSENTIAL ESSAYS OF WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 149–
50, 155 (1992) (describing monopolies as the naturally selected economic agents of
society);.
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Congress was also faced in 1890, and again in 1914, with the growing
political power of the trusts, monopolies, and great aggregations of capital,
which threatened Americans’ longstanding historic values of divided and
diluted political and economic power.246 Professor Peritz, for example, has
observed that “[a]s the [Sherman Act] legislative debates demonstrate, the loss
of political liberty itself became an issue.”247 “[Senator] Sherman and his allies
believed that rough competitive equality was important not only for economic
or vocational liberty, but for political liberty in a free society as well.”248
Senator Hoar warned that the trusts were “a menace to republican institutions
themselves,”249 while Senator Sherman feared the ability of the trusts to
“disturb social order.”250 Thus, “the political impulse behind the Sherman Act
was clearer and more articulate than the economic theory.”251 Similar to the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act also sought “to decentralize power for social

246

See, e.g., HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 227–29 (discussing the growing fears
in America “founded in political realities—the fear that the great business
combinations, being the only centers of wealth and power, would be able to lord it
over all other interests and thus to put an end to traditional American democracy”);
HOFSTADTER III, supra note 31, at 118–20 (“The middle class citizen, as producer and
consumer, was beginning to feel the growth of monopoly and to fear that he would be
ground between large combinations of capital and labor.”).
247
PERITZ, supra note 63, at 24. Professor Peritz further noted that “[t]he concern
for consumer and producer liberty also implicated political liberty . . . [Senator]
Sherman was invoking the fundamental belief that representative government
depended upon an economically independent citizenry, whose independence was
served by widespread ownership of private property.” Id. at 15; see also Lande, supra
note 40, at 99 (“Alarm over corporate aggrandizement of economic, social, and
political power pervaded the [Sherman Act] debate.”).
248
PERITZ, supra note 63, at 15.
249
21 CONG. REC. 3,146 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
250
Id. at 2,460 (statement of Sen. Sherman). Senator Sherman added that
“[s]ociety [was] now disturbed by forces never felt before.” Id. at 2457; see also
HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 197 (“A nation that had gone so fast from
competitive small enterprise to corporate giantism might readily go with equal speed
from corporate giantism to a system of monopolistic tyranny.”).
251
HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 205. Professor Hofstadter added that the
legislators “were reasonably clear about what they were trying to avoid: they wanted
to keep concentrated private power from destroying democratic government.” Id. at
206–07; see also PERITZ, supra note 63, at 15 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2,460 (1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman)) (“‘[I]ndustrial liberty’ called for entrepreneurial
independence, for preservation of the ‘small dealers and worthy men’ threatened by
the new economic order of large-scale enterprise.”); Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1051
(discussing the “political values” behind our antitrust laws, including “a fear that
excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political
pressures”).
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and political reasons.”252
Moral and ethical values and goals also were paramount in Congress’s
minds in passing the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. As noted by Professor
Hofstadter, “the competitive process was believed to be a kind of disciplinary
machinery for the development of character, and the competitiveness of the
people—the fundamental stimulus to national morale—was believed to need
protection.”253 Monopolies were seen as “morally reprehensible,”254 and
anathema to fundamental American notions of “full and free competition.”255
As a result, “[r]epeated references [were] made throughout the [Sherman Act]
proceedings to the policy favoring ‘freedom and fairness’ in commercial
intercourse which was violated by the combinations at which the proposed bill
was aimed.”256 Congress believed that unfair “hindrances to equal opportunity
were to be eliminated.”257 As noted by Professor Peritz, “[t]his strong
sentiment in favor of protecting industrial liberty . . . surpassed even the
abhorrence of higher prices.”258
Finally, from an economic standpoint, Congress had to deal with the
wanton and ruthless destruction of competitors and competition being wrought
by the trusts in the late 1800s and early 1900s. As previously noted,259
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp correctly observed based on both the
legislative history and other substantial sources, that from an economic
standpoint, “the proponents of the Sherman Act were significantly more
252
Fox, supra note 13, at 578; Lande, supra note 40, 129 (discussing the evidence
suggesting that in passing the Clayton Act, Congress was “motivated by concern for
the social and political power possessed by large corporations”).
253
HOFSTADTER II, supra note 26, at 200.
254
THORELLI, supra note 26, at 228.
255
See, e.g., id. at 226.
256
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES, VOL. 1 20 (Earl W. Kintner ed. 1978); see also id. at 155 (quoting 21 CONG.
REC. 2,558–59 (1890) (statement of Senator Pugh that the trusts were “contrary to the
public policy of the United States” because “they hinder, interrupt, and impair the
freedom and fairness of commerce . . . .”)).
257
THORELLI, supra note 26, at 314 (discussing the trusts’ perceived negative
impacts on equality of opportunity); Id. at 327 (discussing “whether individualist
democracy would be able to persist in the brave new world that was unfolding”); Id.
at 569 (“The widespread impression that the growth of giant and anonymous
combinations in business constituted an increasing threat to the cherished equality of
opportunity took on particular significance in an era when the agricultural frontier was
disappearing.”).
258
PERITZ, supra note 63, at 15. Professor Peritz further observed that “Senator
Sherman and his contemporaries were concerned with another kind of freedom—
freedom from corporate control of trade and commerce. Industrial liberty embodied a
sense of the public as competitors and employees of new large combinations of capital,
whose power rendered ‘the boasted liberty of the citizen . . . a myth.’” Id. (alteration
in original).
259
See supra Part II.A.
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concerned about injury to competitors than injury to consumers.”260
Representative William Mason (R-Ill), for example, pointed out that even if
the “trusts ha[d] made products cheaper . . ., [they] ha[d] destroyed legitimate
competition.”261 Both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson
expressed similar concerns.262
Although neoconservative historical revisionists delight in saying that our
antitrust laws “protect competition, not competitors,” they fail to recognize
that their artificially created mantra is completely inconsistent with the actual
legislative histories of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, not to mention
the never-repealed 1936 Robinson-Patman Act. Throughout the history of our
antitrust laws, Congress has recognized that protecting competitors against
unfair and predatory acts is crucial to protecting competition.263
Neoconservative critics also unfairly denigrate Congress’s laudable
historic insights in progressively recognizing that moral and ethical values and
norms are fundamental keys to sound economic and competition policy.264
Indeed, neoconservatives’ assertion that values such as economic fairness and
competitive diversity are so-called “non-economic values” that are somehow
concerned “with values other than the economic well-being of consumers or
the economy as a whole”265 reveal a profound and ultimately biased
260

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 55.
21 CONG. REC. 4,100 (1890) (statement of Rep. Mason). Such “view[s]
derive[d] from the moral precept of Jeffersonian entrepreneurialism and the
consequentialist rationale that such competition promotes economic prosperity.”
PERITZ, supra note 63, at 17.
262
See, e.g., DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, BULLY PULPIT: THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF JOURNALISM 254 (2013)
(discussing President Roosevelt’s concern with “unfair competition, resulting in the
crushing out of competitors”); id. at 730 (discussing President Wilson’s belief in “fair
play” and the need to “open again the fields of competition, so that new men with
brains, new men with capital, new men with energy in their veins, may build up
enterprises in America”).
263
See Harrison, supra note 2 at 409–10 n.2 (“Interestingly, the one portion of the
antitrust laws that is not expressed in general terms is the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13, which provides fairly clear guidance with respect to interpretation and
has been redefined by the current Supreme Court.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s
Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23–24, 44–46 (1989); Horton IV, supra note
12, at 623–34 (detailing the history of the “protecting competition, not competitors”
mantra, and showing its inconsistency with the goals of the Sherman, Clayton, and
Robinson-Patman Acts); Andreas Koutsoudakis, Antitrust More Than a Century After
Sherman:
Why Protecting Competitors Promotes Competition More Than
Economically Efficient Mergers, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 230 (2009) (“Protecting
competitors is one main purpose for which Congress enacted antitrust legislation.”);
Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, supra note 25 at 80–81; Pitofsky, supra note 11, at 1058–
59; see also Robinson-Patman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21a (1936).
264
See, e.g., Horton II, supra note 12, at 46.
265
See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 35.
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misunderstanding of the fundamental requisites for a stable, healthy, and
sustainable competitive economic ecosystem.
As seen, our early antitrust Congresses faced a conflicting and diverse
array of fundamental ideologies and values in seeking to enact laws that would
control the growing problem of trusts and monopolies dominating our
economy.
The chart below sets forth some of the fundamental
values/philosophical clashes that Congress sought to balance.
Social

Moral and Ethical

Equal opportunity v. Freedom of
contract

Fair competition v. Survival of the
fittest

Political

Economic

Divided power/democracy v.
Protection of private property

Diversity/dynamic efficiencies v.
Concentration efficiencies/laissezfaire

Comparing the values chart above to those set forth in Parts II.B and II.C.,
one can see that Congress has continued to face similar philosophical and
ideological conflicts for more than a century. Throughout this time, Congress
has shown the ability to balance and blend our conflicting values and
philosophical differences, and to enact legislation with the potential to advance
fundamental American values and democratic goals—by “deal[ing] with
concentrations of economic power and . . . polic[ing] business behavior that
exploit[s] consumers and exclude[s] competitors.”266 Given the deep
fundamental philosophical and ideological conflicts Congress has had to
balance, it is hardly surprising that Congress consistently has chosen to enact
flexible constitutional-like antitrust laws that allow for growth and judicial
development.
It is time for our Executive and Judicial branches to do their part to begin
addressing “antitrust’s democracy deficit.”267 A good starting point would be
more faithfully honoring and implementing such congressional goals as
protecting competition by: guarding competitors against unfair predation;
preventing undue concentrations through more aggressive merger control;
266
267

First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2573.
Id.

2018

REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST VALUES

239

continuing to prevent anticompetitive collusion while encouraging R&D joint
ventures; and preserving the dynamic efficiencies and technological
innovations resulting from a diverse array of aggressive competitors at all
competitive levels.
IV. REDISCOVERING ANTITRUST’S LOST HISTORIC AMERICAN VALUES
Conservative antitrust commentators rejoice today in claiming that “the
powerful impact of economic analysis” has led to an American antitrust system
that “has become relatively politics-agnostic.”268 In their view, the courts and
executive branch’s deference to neoconservative economic ideologies have
“yield[ed] a body of widely accepted law that is largely impervious to political
intrusion.”269 Neoconservative economics having finally captured the day,
little remains “open to legitimate disagreement.”270
This author respectfully disagrees. Putting aside the differing impacts of
“the ideological differences” between the antitrust enforcers of recent
administrations,271 there is little doubt that American “[a]ntitrust has moved
too far from democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in service
to a laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement.”272 American courts and
enforcers have lost sight of the fundamental values balanced and blended by
Congress for more than 100 years to create a set of regulatory checks and
balances designed to protect our economic system from undue concentrations
and exercises of economic power and their “destructive consequences in a free
society.”273 In so doing, they have precipitated a “destructive alienation” of

268

Voorhees, supra note 1, at 558, 576; see also id. at 562 (noting that over the
past forty years, “economics analysis has taken a central place in the antitrust thinking
of the U.S. Supreme Court as well as the lower courts”).
269
Id. at 576; see also Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 948 (1979) (“Differences remain, but increasingly
they are technical rather than ideological.”).
270
Voorhees, supra note 1, at 576.
271
See, e.g., Salop, supra note 26, at 638.
272
First & Waller, supra note 2, at 2574; Harrison, supra note 2, at 422.
273
James W. Brock, Economic Power, Henry Simons, and a Lost Antitrust Vision
of Economic Conservatism, 58 S.D. L. REV. 443, 443 (2013); see also id. at 461 (“The
decisive role of antitrust policy in meeting that challenge [of making markets work],
and in limiting the destructive consequences of private economic power in a free
society, constitutes the lost vision of one kind of economic conservatism.”); WALTER
ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 7 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ADAMS &
BROCK II] (“[T]he essence of power is dominance. And dominance may arise simply
from disproportionate size. It entails an absence of effective constraints, a freedom
from accountability, and a relative immunity from sanctions.”); HENRY C. SIMONS,
ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 43–44 (1948) (“Political liberty can survive
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antitrust from our most fundamental and essential historic American social,
political, moral, and economic values.274
Congress has had ample opportunities to incorporate into our antitrust laws
neoconservatives’ economic philosophies, but has never done so. As seen,
Congress easily could have done so in passing the HSR Act in 1976, in
enacting the NCRA in 1984, or in amending the NCRPA in 1993 and 2004.
However, in each case Congress declined to do so even though
neoconservative economic ideologies were then largely ascendant. Instead,
Congress chose in 1976, 1984, 1993, and 2004, to strengthen our antitrust laws
while adding a relatively limited set of exceptions to the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Consequently, our courts and antitrust enforcement agencies should stop
interpreting our antitrust laws as though they were somehow written or
amended by Congress to bless neoconservatives’ social, political, moral, and
economic ideologies.
We also need to stop treating neoconservatives’ economic values as a
supposedly neutral set of scientifically objective economic laws. The
preceding review of our antitrust laws’ legislative histories and the history
surrounding them shows that the modern neoconservative economic
philosophies of today are eerily reflective of the laissez-faire values put
forward by the Social Darwinists in the late 1800s, which have been
consistently rejected by Congress. Although wrapped in claims that modern
neoconservative economics are “of course a science,”275 modern evolutionary
biology and economics have shown the alleged scientific bases of Social
Darwinism to represent a misguided and fundamental misreading of Darwin’s
discoveries.276 It is time therefore to stop treating neoconservative economics
and its attendant laissez-faire antitrust implications as hard unrefuted science.
We should instead begin recognizing neoconservative economic ideologies for
the values-laden political, social, moral and economic ideologies they are. By
doing so, we can return to balancing and blending in our antitrust analyses the

only within an effective competitive economic system. Thus, the great enemy of
democracy is monopoly, in all its forms . . . .” (emphasis in original).
274
HOFSTADTER I, supra note 26, at 21.
275
BORK I, supra note 3, at 8; see also PERITZ, supra note 63, at 228 (discussing
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973)) (observing that Judge
Richard Posner has long argued that the promotion of economic efficiency is “positive,
not normative; scientific, not ideological”).
276
See, e.g., BROCK I, supra note 245, at 335 (noting that neoconservative
economists “may have fundamentally misread Darwin and Schumpeter”); ANTITRUST,
THE MARKET, AND THE STATE: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WALTER ADAMS 250–51 (J.
Brock & K. G. Elzinga eds. 1991) (portraying Judge Bork’s concentration efficiencies
arguments as outmoded social Darwinism); Thomas J. Horton, Efficiencies and
Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 168, 186
(2015) [hereinafter Horton V]. See generally Horton II, supra note 12; Horton III,
supra note 12.
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fundamental American political, social, moral, and economic values that
Congress has paid homage to for more than a century.
Pursuing such goals will require us to stop classifying and characterizing
any values not supported by neoconservative economic ideologies as “noneconomic goals” undeserving of antitrust’s protection. As previously argued,
values such as competitive fairness, level economic playing fields, economic
justice, a healthy diversity of competitors, and reduced economic
concentration are actually crucial economic values in the sense that they
provide the foundational underpinnings for a healthy, stable, and sustainable
capitalistic economic system.277 Attempts to label them as “non-economic
values” are therefore overly simplistic and conclusory, and provide a rhetorical
justification for wrongfully denying their powerful progressive economic
implications—implications which call into serious question neoconservatives’
own economic philosophies, which favor increasing economic concentration
and the economic justification of all manner of unethical, immoral, and
economically harmful predatory conduct.278
Neoclassical economics are neither scientifically neutral nor free from
normative social, political, and moral values and ideologies.279 Indeed,
277

See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 442 (2013) (“Because fairness
normally matters more than anything else, it should be an obsession with
policymakers.”); BROCK I, supra note 245, at 332–36 (discussing the importance of
diverse competition and economic opportunity at all levels of our economic system to
ongoing economic innovation and progress); Horton I, supra note 2, at 863
(“Evolutionary biologists and behavioral economists increasingly appreciate and
demonstrate how fundamental and critical our sense of fairness has been to our longterm evolutionary and economic success.”); Horton II, supra note 12 (arguing that a
stable and healthy economic system must be grounded by moral and ethical roots);
Horton V, supra note 276, at 186 (“Economic diversity, variability, and opportunity,
rather than increasing concentration and speculative short-term ‘efficiencies,’ are
therefore the keys to the overall health, productivity and robustness of our economic
system.”); Stucke I, supra note 1, at 608 (discussing the importance of ethics, morals,
and fairness to the functioning of our market economy).
278
See, e.g., Foer, supra note 3, at 116 (questioning the labeling of various values
as “non-economic,” and noting that “the line between what is political/social and what
is economic is not always clear”); Harrison, supra note 2, at 425–26 (arguing that
neoconservative antitrust economists’ attacks on alternative economic theories and
values “borders on a kind of intellectual bullying”).
279
See, e.g., ADAMS & BROCK II, supra note 273, at 302 (“[A]lthough economic
Darwinism makes superior economic performance the centerpiece of its policy
position, its advocates concede that measuring such performance is inordinately
difficult, if not outright impossible.”); BORK I, supra note 3, at 124 (conceding that
“[t]he real objection to performance tests and efficiency defenses in antitrust law is
that they are spurious. They cannot measure the factors relevant to consumer welfare,
so that after the economic extravaganza was completed we should know no more than
before it began.”); Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, in MONOPOLY
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economists Walter Adams and James Brock observe that economic analyses
in antitrust cases “hinge . . . ultimately on the analyst’s premises, values, and
belief system[s].”280 As Professor Lao suggests, it is therefore time to deal
with the real economic values conflicts in antitrust, instead of relying on
economic proxies that unilaterally declare the values debates to be
scientifically and theoretically resolved.281
V. CONCLUSION
For more than 100 years, Congress has carefully and deliberately balanced
and blended a diverse array of fundamental social, political, moral, and
economic values and goals in crafting our antitrust laws. Although it has had
plenty of chances to do so, Congress has never adopted or accepted any single
set of economic objectives, and has never endorsed neoconservatives’
economic ideologies. Instead, Congress has treated Americans’ fundamental
social, political, moral, and economic values as interdependent, and deserving
of protection against the menaces of concentrated economic power.
It is therefore time to return to an antitrust regulatory system that better
reflects Congress’s dynamic historical balancing of multiple fundamental
social, political, moral, and economic values. To do so, we must begin
rediscovering antitrust’s lost values, and recommence our historic pursuit of
an ethical, moral, and fair free-enterprise system truly devoted to our longterm economic and social welfare. In pursuing such a quest, we can begin
moving away from our increasing global isolation and growing economic
inequality.282 We can instead seek a closer convergence with the more
progressive and enlightened systems of antitrust and competition regulation
developing in Europe and throughout the world—systems ironically attuned
and deferential to, and built around, the fundamental historic American social,
political, moral, and economic values Congress has long recognized and
sought to protect.

POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION 160 (Edwin Mansfield ed. 1968) (arguing that “economics offers no
objective measure of the vitality of competition in all its aspects”); Foer, supra note 3,
at 116.
280
Adams & Brock I, supra note 35, at 294; Harrison, supra note 2, at 409 (“The
core notion of examining all policies, laws, and values from any relevant perspective
is something that is too often lacking in legal scholarship.”).
281
See Lao, supra note 4, at 685. Professor Lao astutely calls for “an honest
conversation on what values should matter and why . . . and whose interests are
important and how these interests should be reconciled if they conflict.” Id.
282
See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012).

